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Well, why do we study the history of any science?
Current work, so one would think, will preserve
whatever is still useful of the work of preceding
generations...0It is certainly better to scrap out-,
-worn inodes of thought than to stick to them indef
initely. Nevertheless, we stand to profit from
visits to -the lumber room provided we do not stay
there too long.
Joseph A. Schumpeter
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CHAPTER- I
Jevons in Perspective
It is the curious habit of many students of economic
theory to seek out those past economists in whose writings
might be found the first embryos of a given theory and to
impute to

such menthe eredit for having founded an entire

school of thoughto

Thus we are wrongly informed that Adam

Smith "discovered” economic science, that the supply-cost
and marginal utility approaches to value theory were orig
inated by David Ricardo and William Stanley Jevons,
respectively, and, finally, that Alfred Marshall, using
his famous scissors, was the first to cut the value prob
lem into two parts o Those who offer such unscholarly gen
eralities appear to ignore the fact that economic ideas,
like bedrock in a vast river, have come into being only
through endless evolution, each generation adding its own
new layer to the hardpan0

But economic science seems par

ticularly amenable to the vague syllogizing of students
largely because of its close alliance with common-sense
reasoning,, ^

It is this alliance which poses a barrier to

■^See Jo A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis,
Hew York Oxford University Press, 1954-, P« 9°
-1-

-2“
our determining who the real originators are*

We know, for

example, that for many centuries laymen have intuitively
understood the laws of supply and demand, and this makes it
even more difficult to trace the fountainhead of supplydemand analysis.,

Who would venture to say that the

writings of a 14-th century millwright or wool merchant con
stitute the discovery of the theory of supply and demand?
It is the old case of "cogito, ergo I am an economic theo
retician,, "
Such is the problem which confronts us in evaluating
the contributions of William Stanley Jevons (1835-82) to
the theory of value:

how to adjudge the originality of

these contributions in light of the achievements of his
precursors and the criticisms of his successors»
Our purpose is not to discount the importance of the
original ideas which Jevons conceived, but rather to ferret
out those for which he deserves logical priority and to set
them apart from other concepts which are defective in terms
of modern theory„ This task is made no less difficult by
the fact that many of Jevons* more original concepts are
cloaked in loose, quasi-mathematical garb which does much
to obscure their intended meanings.

Then too, Jevons lacks

the literary facility of authors such as Edgeworth and
Marshall;
2

2

this also serves to discount his importance in

Jevons never held any delusions about his inadequate
writing ability, though even this surpassed his competence

-3the history of economic doctrine, and has even led contem
porary

writers to misjudge his achievements.

Quite naturally, Jevons' writings reflect the influence of certain intellectual ancestors,

the most signifi

cant of which are Bentham, Cournot and various early
pioneers of marginal utility analysis.

Though not properly

classified as an economist, Jeremy Bentham (174-8-1832), one
of the first English utilitarians, had a profound effect
upon the writings of many nineteenth century economists.
The leader of a group known as the "Philosophical Radicals,"
Bentham sought to develop a science of human behavior
applicable to polities, jurisprudence, economics, religion
and other related disciplines.

The major tenet of his

philosophy— "the greatest happiness of the greatest number,
4
that is the measure of right and wrong" — is known to all
students of economic history and is eloquently phrased in
the first paragraph of his Introduction to the Principles
of Morals and Legislation;

as a teacher. In his later years he wrote: "Sometimes I
have enjoyed lecturing, especially in logic, but for years
past I have never entered the lecture room without a feel
ing probably like that of going to the pillory" (Quoted in
J. M. Keynes, Essays and Sketches in Biography, New York,
Meridian Books’
^ 1956, p . 159) •
3
.See T. W. Hutchison, A Review of Economic Doctrines,
1870^1929, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1955, P° 14-.
4
Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment on Government and An Intro
duction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ed.
Wilfrid Harrison, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 194-8, p. 125.

...Nature has placed mankind under the governance
of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It
is for them alone to point out what we ought to
do, as well as determine what we shall do...Every
effort that we can make to throw off our subjec
tion will serve but to demonstrate and confirm
it.„.The principle of utility recognizes this sub
jection and assumes it for the foundation of that
system, the object of which is to rear the fabric
of felicity by the hands of reason and law. Sys
tems which attempt to question it, deal in sounds
instead of sense, in caprice instead of reason,
in darkness instead of light.5
This principle of utility, or, as it is popularly termed,
"hedonism," presupposes that all feelings are capable of
scientific measurement, so that Bentham's utility emerges
as some sort of "psychic reality" which can be known by
simple introspection.
Jevons is disturbed by-Bentham*s cardinality assump
tion, and tries to redefine utility in non-cardinal terms.
In lieu of Bentham*s proposition that utility is directly
measurable, he offers the argument that utility can be mea
sured indirectly by the observable effeets of a feeling, as
consumers react to price changes.

But what he fails to

realize is that this also presupposes cardinal measurement.

7

(In 1890 Marshall made a similar mistake by defining utility
in terms of consumer income.) The cardinality question was a nut

5Ibid.
^See ¥. S. Jevons' Theory of Political Economy, New
York, Kelley & Millman, 1957* P» 12.
7
'Eor an excellent statement on cardinal vs. ordinal
measurement see Schumpeter, History, pp. 1060-1066.

-5which Jevons was never quite able to crack, though it must
I

. . . . .

be admitted that he^made an attempt in the first edition of
his Theory.8
Modern theory has proven that the.alliance between
Benthamite hedonism and economics was, at best,-an unholy
one.

Yet we must not overvalue the debt which Jevons owed

to Bentham.

Contemporary writers, in an apparent attempt

at skimming the cream from the milk, suggest that Jevons'
theories can be divorced
from their...hedonistic basis without substan
tial alteration of their essential features, and
with a distinct gain in the favor of actuality.9
Jevons himself denies that the subjective valuations of one
person can be compared with those of someone else:
...I see no means by which such comparison can
be accomplished....But even if we could compare
the feelings of different minds, we should not
need to do so; for one mind only affects another
indirectly. Every event in the outward world is
represented in the mind by a corresponding
motive, and it is by the balance of these that
the will is swayed....Each person is to other
persons a portion of the outward world..Thus
motives in the mind of A may give rise to phe
nomena which may be represented by motives in
the mind of B; but between A and B there is a
gulf. Hence the weighing of motives must always
be confined to the bosom of the individual.10
Jevons' allusion to the problems of interpersonal utility

8See p. 18.
9A. A. Young, "Jevons® Theory of Political Economy,"
American Economic Review, II, 1912, p. 578.
Jevons, Theory, p. 14-.

-6 -

comparison provides a key to his analysis.

Whereas Bentham

had inferred that such comparison was possible and, indeed,
necessary for the purposes of analysis, Jevons makes an
attempt to avoid this.

He also tries to free himself from

the ethical questions which were posed by Bentham and other
early hedonists.

To the extent that he was successful in

overcoming these two factors, we are able to omit the util
itarianism from his writings without appreciably injuring
their scientific content.
Of no lesser importance was the debt which Jevons owed
to Augustin Cournot (1801-77)»

A French writer who

pioneered econometric method, Cournot was not widely read
by English economists until the latter part of the nine
teenth century.

One of the first English acknowledgements

of Cournot's major work, Recherches sur les Principles
/
/
Mathematiques de la Theories des Richesses, appears m the
second edition of Jevons’ Theory (1879):
...This work must occupy a remarkable position in
the history of (mathematical economics). It is
strange that it should have remained for me among
Englishmen to discover its value....I procured a
copy of the work as far back as 1872, but have
only recently studied it with sufficient care to
form any definite opinion upon its value.H

Ibid., pp. xxix-xxx. After the writings of Cournot,
Dupuit, and others were unearthed, Jevons felt that all
questions of priority had finally been solved: "...these
questions are really of little or no importance to us now
....We are all shelved on the matter of priority, except,
of course, as regards details and general method of expo
sition, etc." (Letters and Journal of W. Stanley Jevons,
ed. H. A. Jevons, London, MacMillan & Co., 1886, p . 409)

-7Many of the changes and corrections which Jevons undertook
in his second edition, especially as regards the notation
of marginal utility, might he attributed to the influence
of this earlier writer<> While admitting that Cournot's
Recherches was so significant that it should be known to
all, Jevons confessed that his own knowledge of mathematics
precluded a complete understanding of its contents.

It

cannot be sufficiently stressed that Jevons was never the
mathematician he hoped to be, as can be seen in his treatment of simultaneous equations 12 in Chapter 17 of the
Theory,

It is only unfortunate that he was so poorly

equipped to handle the differential calculus which he con
sidered so essential.

As Young points out, Jevons1 "use
14
of the mathematical method is more apparent than real,"
Aside from his poor understanding of mathematics per se,
Jevons also misunderstood the real nexus between mathe
matics and economics, N According to Eckard, Jevons appar
ently believed that
...economic relationships follow mathematical
laws through an intricate succession of rela
tionships. I grant that mathematical symbols
are a very convenient aid in expressing the
results of reasoning. But I refuse to concede
that a mathematical operation can be validly

12

Eor a discussion of the meaning of simultaneous
equations and their importance to economics see Schumpeter,
History, p. 970«
15

See Jevons, Theory, pp. 114-118.

^Young, "Jevons' Theory," p. 588.

-8employed to prove an economic proposition,- even
though it may make an excellent illustration,15
The general result is that Jevons, the mathematician, fre
quently outdistances Jevons, the economist, and sound anal
ysis is sometimes left to fend for itself,
xJevons was not the first major writer to treat marginal
utility.

Others before him, notably Senior, Whately,

Lloyd, ^ and Gossen, had broken ground for this conceptual
device; what is remarkable is that only a handful of these
•

•

TO

men--Gossen and Senior were among them
Jevons,

--were known to

In the preface to the second edition of the Theory

he acknowledges several unnoticed writers for having influ
enced his thought:

Dionysius Lardner, whose treatment of

demand in the Railway Economy served as a model for Jevons"
"laws of utility"; Richard Jennings, whose Natural Elements
of Political Economy provided Jevons with insights into
utilitarian measurement; and, of lesser influence

15Eo V. Eckard, Economics of W. S, Jevons, Washington,
D, C., American Council on Public Affairs, 194-0, p, 94,
^These first three writers represent the so-called
"Oxford Utility School,” which flourished during the 18501
1s.
Prior to the appearance of Jevons® Theory and Gossen*s
Entwickelung der Gesetze des men-schlichen Verkehrs (Berlin,
Prager, 1854) they were considered the foremost exponents
of the marginal utility concept. See Hutchison, Review,
p„ 14; also Schumpeter, History, pp. 483-486,
17'There is a remarkable resemblance between the
writings of Jevons on the one hand and those of both Senior
and Gossen on the other. However, Jevons arrived at his
theory of value quite independently and did not know of
these works until after the first edition of the•Theory.
See Jevons, ibid., pp. xxxii-xxxix.

von Thunen, MacLeod, Cliffe Leslie and Ingram,,
It is a credit to Jevons* genius that he was ahle to
gather up the scattered raw materials which these writers
had left behind and to employ them in the erection of his
own theoretical structure.

At the same time we must

acknowledge the fact that several of his building materials
were heuristieally imperfect and should have been discarded
at the outset.

Like Senior before him, Jevons made only a

slight attempt at analyzing the process of individual valu19
ation and the subjective factors which influence it.
He
wrongly identified marginal utility with marginal demand
and market.price, and actually had very little to say about
pricing at all. 20 Furthermore, he treated each individ
ual’s utility as a function of a single commodity, rather
than all the commodities involved in a person's consumption
habits; this too was a characteristic error of the early
utilitarians.21
The following analysis will attempt to uncover
1P

The writings of other economists to whom Jevons was
indebted are. listed in Appendix V to the Theory. See
ibid., pp. 322-342.
19See H. J. Davenport, Value and Distribution, Chicago
University of Chicago Press, 1908, p. 334.
2QIbid., p. 336.
21
See Hutchison, History, pp. 114-115. Edgeworth cor
rected this error by relating utility to a consumer’s
entire consumption or Versorgungslage. For further infor
mation the reader is referred to F. Y. Edgeworth, Mathemat
ical Psychics, London, C. Kegan Paul & Co., 1881, pp. 31-42

-10critieal flaws such as these.
to he posed are:

Some of the major questions

Given a distrust of the, older classical

economics, and the rudimentary tools of marginal analysis,
how did Jevons trace the outline of a new theory based upon
a union of mathematics and English utilitarianism?

Does

this new organon represent an improvement over the classi
cal position on value?

And finally, are the criticisms

which Marshall directs at devonian theory consistent with
twentieth century analysis, or is Marshall guilty of
Ricardian "wrong-headedness," as Schumpeter would have us
believe?
The reader will note that this paper is initially
divided into two parts:

Part I is devoted to a synopsis of

Jevonian marginal utility analysis and has been drawn
largely from Jevons* Theory (5th Edition, 1957)» which
forms the core of his deduction; in Part II the author
offers a presentation and evaluation of Marshallian criti
cisms of the Theory.
Part I
Chapter II, "The Utilitarian Framework," treats
Jevons* statements on the measurement and dimensions of
utility, together with his formulation of the "laws of
utility."
Chapter III, "A Preface to Distribution Theory:

Con

sumer Allocation," demonstrates how Jevons applied the mar
ginal utility apparatus to several simple allocation

-11problems .
Chapter IV, "Marginal Utility and the Exchange Mecha
nism," furnishes an outline of Jevons' theory of exchange.
Important points to he touched on include:

(1) the "law of

indifference"; (2) "trading bodies"; and (3) the derivation
of exchange equations.

An attempt is made at tracing out

the process whereby Jevons extended the barter concept to
the more complex cases of exchange, involving many commodi
ties and trading bodies.
Part II
Chapter V, "The Marshallian Compromise," diagnoses the
criticisms which Marshall directed at Jevons' theoretical
work.

Emphasis is placed on the following critical points:

(1) Are "real costs" an implicit assumption in Jevons'
Theory? (2) Are Marshall's criticisms of Jevons' "poor
technique" valid, or do they obscure the fact that Jevons'
real contribution lies in his delineation of marginal util
ity, not in the method by which this delineation was accom
plished? (3) Is Marshall justified in rebuking Jevons for
his so-called "hedonics"? and finally (4) Does Jevons
really fail to comprehend the role of time periods in eco
nomic analysis as Marshall implies?

Each of these points

will be treated in turn.
In conclusion, then, we will be concerned with
appraising Jevons' contributions to the area of pure theory

-12- .
both in terms of Marshall's comments

22

porary critics, including Schumpeter,

pt

and those of Contem
Hutchison, Roll and

Stigler.
One wonders why Jevons was better known during his
lifetime for his statistical investigations into the busi
ness cycle and for various papers on currency and
...... 24finance,
rather than for his eminently more important
theoretical writings.
to two sources.

The reasons for this can be traced

The first lies in the nature of Jevons

himself:
...Jevons left hardly any personal pupils, a
fact that was in turn due not only to lack of
opportunity (he never taught in a strategic
position) but also to his amiable modesty or
lack of assertiveness....But it is also true
that his work in economic theory lacks finish.
His performance was not up to his vision.
Brilliant conceptions and profound insights....
were never properly worked out; they were
stated as apertjus and so intermingled with old
stuff as to look almost superficial.25
22Most of Marshall's criticisms have been drawn from
his Principles of Economics (1890) and a posthumously pub
lished work entitled The Memorials of Alfred Marshall
(1925).
2^The reader should be aware of the fact that Schum
peter looked more favorably upon Jevons and the Austrians
than many other contemporary critics; quite often his crit
icisms of Marshall reflect this bias, as we shall see in
Part II.
24 See W. S. Jevons, Investigations in Currency and
Finance, London, MacMillan & Co., 1884; also his Money and
the Mechanism of Exchange, London, H. S. King & Go., 1878;
and Principles of Economics, London, MacMillan & Co., 1905.
^Schumpeter, History, p. 826.

-13But there is another, perhaps more significant reason:
Jevons, as an "originator" in the hest sense of the word,
felt impelled to break with a tradition which had become
the life blood of English economists.,
role of a national leader,

Marshall, in the

was obliged to defend this

tradition, to protect it from its detractors, and to dispel
forever the "mists of ephemeral criticism." 27' It was inev
itable that the sparks of a "devonian revolution" would be
stamped out before they had time to kindle the fires of a
new English school.
To test the mettle of Jevons' thesis and Marshall's
antithesis the following is directed.

2^See ibid., p. 840.
27See ibid., pp. 920-921.

PART I
JEVONIAH VALUE THEORY
In the last few months I have fortunately struck
out what I have no doubt is the true Theory of
Economy, so thorough-going and consistent, that
I cannot now read other books on the subject with
out indignation.
William Stanley Jevons

CHAPTER II
The Utilitarian Framework
The genesis of Jevonian value theory can he traced to
1862 and the presentation of Jevons' "Brief Account of a
General Mathematical Theory of Political Economy" before
the British Association at Cambridge.

It was Jevons' hope

that the paper, however reminiscent of earlier writings by
Whately, Senior, and Lloyd, might effect a reappraisal of
Ricardian doctrine, which for more than a half-century had
served as the sine qua non of economic science.

To his

disappointment the paper failed to attract, even moderate
attention.

An exclusive reliance upon hedonistic ideas to

explain value, a proclivity to dress economics in the
"heavy" armor of the calculus, a disavowal of the popular
cost-of-production principles of Ricardo and Mill— these
were the ingredients of a pastry which members of the Asso
ciation did not even care to sample:
A true theory of economy can only be attained by
going back to the great springs of human action—
the feelings of pleasure and pain.1

Jevons, Theory, p. 304. J. A. La Nauze has estab
lished February 1*5, 1860 as the date Jevons discovered the
significance of marginal utility (See R. S. Howey, The
Rise of the Marginal Utility School, 1870-1889, Lawrence,
-15-

-16As if to acknowledge its indifference, the Association dis
missed the paper perfunctorily and never offered to publish
it.
Publication of Jevons* aper^u was deferred until 1866,
when it was printed in extenso in the Journal of the Statistical Society of hondor^.2 Yet this proved no more
fruitful than had the 1862 presentation and, largely as a
result of critical indifference, Jevons temporarily put
pure theory to one side and resumed his statistical inves
tigations into commercial crises.
When in 1868 (and again in 1870) Fleming Jenkin pubx

lished several articles^ bearing close similarity to
Jevons* original abstract on value, Jevons recognized the
need for the immediate publication of a more complete
statement of his principles of economics.

During the

hurried months between December, 1870, and August, 1871* he
addressed his energies solely to this task, quite frequently
to the detriment of his health.

The final product of his

labors, the Theory of Political Economy, was accepted for
publication by the MacMillan Company in September, 1871.

Kansas, University of Kansas Press, I960, pp. 1, 225).
2

W. S. Jevons, "Brief Account of a General Mathemati
cal Theory of Political Economy," Journal of the Statisti•cal Society of London, XXIX, 1866, pp. 282-287.
^See Fleming Jenkin, The Graphic Representation of the
Laws of Supply and Demand, and Other Essays on Political
Economy, London, London School Reprints, 1^31«

-17(1) The Measurement and Dimensions of Utility
Comparison of Jevons' Theory with his. 1862 paper shows
that all the original fibers remain, occasionally distended,
frequently rewoven, always strengthened:
...Repeated reflection and inquiry have led me to
the- somewhat novel opinion, that value depends
entirely upon utility,.,.that we have only to
trace out carefully the natural laws of the vari
ation of utility...in order to arrive at a satis
factory theory of exchange, of which the ordinary
laws of supply and demand are a necessary conse
quence. 4Moreover,
...it is clear- “that Economics, if it is to he a
science at all, must he a mathematical science
.... simply because it deals with (variations
in) quantities.5
Jevons well realizes that the feasibility of applying the
calculus to human feelings might be questioned.

The mind

cannot add or subtract feelings, thereby effecting a bal
ance between what is pleasurable and what is painful.
Jevons denies, therefore, that utility is measurable in
the cardinal sense:
...There is no unit of labour, or suffering, or
enjoyment.o..I have granted that we can hardly
form the conception of a unit of pleasure or
pain, so that the numerical expression of quan
tities of feeling seems to be out of question.6
Yet the implication is made that while utility cannot be

4

Jevons, Theory, pp. 1-2.

^Ibid., p. 3°
^Ibid., pp. 7? 12.

-18measure d directly, it might he measured indirectly hy its
observable effects.

7

He also implies that, as more and

more statistical data becomes generally available to econ
omists, they eventually would be able to quantify utility.
For the present, however, Jevons proposes that money-price
Q

will serve as a fairly accurate "measuring rod of utility."
At least two major errors in Jevons* initial state
ments might be noted.

In the first place he implies that

the utility of every commodity to its consumer is some
function of the quantity of that commodity alone, rather
than of total consumption.

In simple mathematical nota

tion an individual's total utility could be written:
f(x1)

+

g(x£)

+

h(x^)

+

....,

where x^, X£, x^, ... represent commodities.
Henger were also guilty of this error.

Walras and

The-more correct

approach can be credited to Edgeworth, who established
7

........

'Stigler observes that Jevons was a good deal more
skeptical of the measurability of utility in his first
(1871) than in his second (1879) edition; e.g., in the
1879 edition he deletes the following: "I confess that it
seems to me difficult even to imagine- how such estimations
(of utility) and summations can be made with any approach
to accuracy. Greatly though I admire the clear and pre
cise notions of Bentham, I know not where his numerical
data are to be found" (ibid., p. 12). See Stigler, "The
Development of Utility Theory," Journal of Political Econ
omy, LVIII, 1950, p. 34-1.
8 Jevons, Theory, p. 13. Jevons explains that he
"never attempt(s) to estimate the whole pleasure gained by
purchasing a commodity; the theory merely express(es) that,
when a man has purchased enough, he would derive equal
pleasure from the possession of a small quantity more as he
would from the money price of it" (ibid'.).

-19that an individual's utility is a function of all commodi
ties involved in his consumption pattern.
A somewhat more subtle error of Jevons' is found in
his statements on interpersonal utility comparison.

He

emphatically states that this is impossible:
•

...The reader will find...that there is never,
in any single sentence, an attempt made to com
pare the amount of feeling in one mind with that
in another....Every mind is... inscrutable to
every other mind, and no common denominator of
feeling seems possible.9

Yet several such comparisons are made later on in the
Theory when he passes on to a discussion of exchange, as
will be noted in Chapter IV.

The conditions by which one

feeling is said to be greater than another had been set
down by Bentham as early as 1823; Jevons is unequivocal in
his acceptance of them:
...To a person considered by himself, the value
of a pleasure or pain, considered by itself,
will be greater or less according to the four
following circumstances: —
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Its
Its
Its
Its

intensity.
duration.
certainty or uncertainty.
propinquity or remoteness.

Strictly speaking, every feeling has two dimensions:
intensity and duration.

Whether pleasure or pain, a feel

ing must last for a certain period of time, and while it
q
/Ibid., p. 14. See also Jevons' letter ot Cairnes,
January,. 1872 (Reprinted in R. D. Black's "Jevons and
Cairnes," Economica, XXVII, August, I960, p. 228).
10Bentham, Fragment, p. 151.

-20lasts, it must “be more or less intense,,

The anticipation

of future events must also be considered, as a source of
satisfaction:

the more developed a person becomes mentally .

and socially, the more important his anticipation of future
feelings will be.

Yet the uncertainty of future events

will tend to cause even the most civilized individual to
discount them.
Given these circumstances of feeling, everyone will
act
...to satisfy (his) wants to the utmost with the
least effort— to procure the greatest amount of
what is desirable at the expense of the least
that is undesirable.il
All human conduct will turn upon this innate desire to max
imize positive feelings, or, what is the same thing, to
minimize negative ones.

This is the key to mathematical

treatment of economic concepts:

as a science of human

behavior, economics differs from other social sciences in
being a calculus of feeling, treating maximum and minimum
values.
Bentham1
1s schema can be extended to define certain
terms relevant to the science of economics.

Commodity is

given to mean "any object, substance, action, or service,
12
which can afford pleasure or ward off pain,"
and utility,
'

'

the abstract ability which is possessed by a commodity to

Jevons, Theory, p. 57«
12

Ibid., pp. 57~38.

-21satisfy some desire.

Jevons warns that utility is not a

quality inherent in the nature of things, as the writings
%

.........................

of Smith and other "Classicists" imply; rather, it is "a
circumstance of things arising out of their relation to
man's requirements."1-^ To a thirsty man a quart of water
has a very high degree of utility; yet, after drinking all
the water he requires, a point of satiety is reached
beyond which any additional water has zero utility.

Con

sequently, "...utility is not proportional to commodity;
the very same articles vary in utility according as we
already possess more or less of the same article."
Conversely, discommodity refers to those objects which
possess the quality of causing inconvenience or harm; ashes
and sewage are good examples.

As to the abstract concept,

that is, the opposite or negative of utility, Jevons uses
the term disutility, a notion which, according to Schumpeter,
he was the first to develop.^
(2) The Law of the Variation of Utility
Since utility is measured by the additions made to an

I5Ibid., p. 43.
14Ibid., p. 44.
.15
^See Schumpeter, History, p. 1057° However original
the idea of "disutility" seems, it is, nonetheless, con.fusing at times. "Walras" treatment was more elegant— he
introduced the marginal utility of leisure in complete sym
metry to the theory of consumption— but not much more
instructive" (Stigler, "Utility Theory," p. 321).

-22individual's happiness, and such happiness is given as var
iable over time, Jevons proposes that certain natural laws
of the variation of utility can be formulated.

The deduc

tion of these principles and the application of them to
distribution and exchange processes comprise the largest
segment of Jevons' Theory.
The "Law of the Variation of Utility" is predicated
upon the aforementioned fact that utility bears no propor
tional relationship to commodity:
o..Utility may be treated as a quantity of two
dimens.ions, one dimension consisting in the quan
tity of the commodity and the other in the inten
sity of the effect produced upon the c o n s u m e r . 16
Suppose a day's supply of food to be divided into ten equal
.

parts. '

The utility of the first two-tenths is infinitely

great, since these portions are absolutely essential to sup
porting life.

The third portion, while less necessary than

the first two, is highly desired; the fourth, of less sig
nificance; and the fifth, a matter of indifference.

As

successive portions are consumed, the degree of utility

Jevons, Theory, p. 47.
171The division of a commodity into ten portions is
purely arbitrary: "If we had taken twenty or a hundred or
more equal-parts , the same -general principle would hold
true, namely, that each small portion would be less useful
and necessary than the last. The law may be considered to
hold true theoretically, however small the increments are
made;- and in this way we shall at last reach -a figure which
is undistinguishable from a continuous curve" (ibid.,
pp. 47-48). This qualification is important as far as
aggregate consumption is concerned, which will vary by
quantities which are infinitely small compared with the
total consumption.

-23attaching to each tenth will diminish, each increment
becoming less necessary than the previous one.

Jevons does

not pretend to be the originator of the concept of dimin
ishing utility, and notes that earlier writers, such as
Senior in his "Law of Variety" and Banfield with his "Law
of the Subordination of Wants," had given the principle a
*|O
less rigorous statement.
19
The concept can easily be translated to a diagram.
Measuring quantity of commodity on the horizontal axis (OX),
and the degree of utility, or intensity of effect upon the
consumer, on the vertical axis (OY), Jevons was one of the
first economists to illustrate this principle:

FIGURE I

*|0

Schumpeter traces the concept to an even earlier
writer, F. Galiani: "What separates Galiani from Jevons...
is, first, that he lacked the concept of marginal utility...
and, second, that he failed to apply his analysis to the
problems of cost and distribution" (History, p. 301).
19To avoid repetition, the author has combined Jevons'
Figures 3 and 4 (Theory, pp. 46, 49) in the above diagram,

-24...The law of the variation of the degree of util
ity of food may thus he represented by a continuous
curve pbq.. .and the perpendicular height of each
point of the curve above the line ox, represents
the degree of utility of the commodity when a cer
tain amount has been c o n s u m e d .20
(3) Hie Law of the Variation of the Final Degree of Utility
A careful distinction must be made between the total
utility arising from the consumption of any commodity and
the degree of utility attaching to any given portion of it.
In terms of Figure I these are shown by an area, aa'b’b ,
and a line, a'b*. respectively.

The total utility of the

food individuals consume consists in maintaining life and
is infinitely great; degree of utility, on the other hand,
relates to changes in the quantity of commodity and total
utility.

In mathematical notation, if x is the quantity of

commodity, or the independent variable, and u is the total
utility arising from the consumption of x, or the dependent
variable, then the degree of utility is
...the differential coefficient of u considered
as a function of x, and will itself be another
function of x.„..(or, symbolically)
at the limit)

21

du .
dx

a

u ....(and

A x

Degree of utility is important to Jevons only as regards

Figure I.
20Ibid., p. 48.
21

Ibid., p. 51®
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Failure to distinguish between total utility and

final degree of utility had been the source of much con
fusion in economic thinking prior to Jevons' time.
Given this distinction,
...we may state as a general law, that the degree
of

u t i l i t y

varies

w i t h

the

q u a n t i t y

of

c o m m o d i t y ,

" anc^ ultimately decreases as that quantity
increases. No commodity can be named whieh we
continue to desire with the same force, whatever
be the quantity already in use or possession.23
'■
24
Jevons accords credit to Jennings
for having first appre
ciated the importance of this "Law of the Variation of the
.

Final Degree of Utility."
b e f o r e

him,

that

the

He implies, as did Jennings

pri n c i p l e
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two

parameters:

in the first place, all wants are capable of satiety; and,
secondly, as the satisfaction produced by one commodity
diminishes, this good cannot be transferred to another use
in order to achieve the greater satisfaction it initially
produced, or, in other words, different commodities are not
perfectly substitutable for one another in the satisfaction
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-26of certain wants. 25
^
(4) Notation of Utility
Expressing the dimensions of economic quantities is a
task no less difficult than the measurement of other physi
cal quantities; in many respects economic notation is even
more troublesome, since the science must delineate certain
quantities in terms of rates of change, as in.the case of
compound interest determination.

Apropos of utilitarian

measurement, the economist is confronted with the problem
that the final degree of utility is an instantaneous state,
quite independent of time.

That is to say, time enters

only as a negative factor.

How then can we distinguish

between instantaneous final degree of utility, on the one
hand, and total utility, which is given as a function of
both intensity and duration, on the other?
Jevons proposes that the final degree of utility will
25
■'In this writer's opinion Jevons made a more impor
tant contribution to the literature when he extended his
Law of the Variation of the Final Degree of Utility in his
Principles of Economics. In this work the principle is
placed in a truer context, the monetary economy; it becomes
an assumption upon which the law of demand is founded:
"When sugar is cheapened larger quantities in the whole will
be demanded; this will arise from some who have already used
it using more, from some who did not use any beginning to
use it" (Principles, p. 57) • Jevons also allows for the
variability of income among various classes: "The general
rule that as a commodity is cheapened its demand is
increased...also depends upon the fact that the poorer
classes of society are far more numerous than the richer,
so that the cheapening brings it within a constantly
expanding area of buyers" (ibid., p. 58)•
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-28What promises to "be a lesson in illumination becomes an
exercise in confusion!
The history of economic theory holds many examples of
writers who persisted in confusing marginal and total util
ity.

Smith had spoken of both "exchange value" and "use

value," the former arising out of the amount of labor
embodied in the production of a commodity, and the latter,
from a commodity's "intrinsic" worth.

Mill slightly

improved on Smith's theory by presenting "exchange value"
as a relationship:
Value is a relative term. The value of a thing
means the quantity of some other thing, or of
things in general, which it exchanges f o r . 28
But what precisely is value relative to? Jevons asks.

If

value implies a relation, how can it be "some other thing"?
Similarly, how can a commodity "possess" intrinsic value,
as though there were an abstract "thing" which lies within
it?

To be sure, there are certain qualities inherent in

gold and diamonds which will influence their value, but
such intrinsic qualities are not synonymous with the term
"value."

Rather, this word "...merely expresses the cir

cumstance of (a commodity's) exchanging in a certain ratio
for some other substance." 29
From the fragmentary definitions of his predecessors

.J.S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy, London.
Longmans, 1936, p. 4-78.
29

Jevons, Theory, p. 77*

-29Jevons discerns three distinct meanings which have tradi
tionally been confused:
(1) Value in use = total utility;
(2) Esteem = final degree of utility;.
(3) Purchasing power = rati© of exchange.
Eor economic theory to take on any sort of clarity in the
future Jevons maintains that one must avoid use of the term
nvalue" altogether,
stead.

and substitute these meanings in its

He claims the last term, "ratio of exchange," as

his own invention, though.Le Trosne and Condillac utilized
a similar one (le rapport d 'echange).
Employing his earlier notations, Jevons gives symbolic
statement to the three terms.

Smith's "value in use," or

total utility, is the integral of U*dM and its dimensions
are HU.

"Esteem," or the degree of utility, has a single

dimension, U.

Finally, "purchasing power," the ratio of

exchange, is given as unity, since it is without dimension,
and is written as H°.

3°Ibid., p. 81.
31The reader will note that Jevons reverts to using
^
the term in a later discussion. See "Footnotes to Exchange:
The 'True' Origin of Value," p. 65 •

CHAPTER III
A Preface to Distribution Theory;
Consumer Allocation
...In 1870 there was no theory of distribution.
Most English economists after Smith devoted sep
arate chapters to rent, wages, and. profits, but
without important exception such chapters were
only descriptive of the returns to the three
most important social classes of contemporary
England.1
The Jevonian position on distribution has been the
subject of much controversy since it was originally stated
in the first edition of the Theory. Several authors, .
including Stigler 2 and Roll, 3 question the originality of
Jevons' distribution theory, viewing it as little more than
a
"warmed-over Classicism." At the other extreme Hutchison
5
and Davenport^ regard it as a.major contribution to the
literature.

This apparent redundancy is at once explained

J. Stigler, Production and Distribution Theories,
Hew York, MacMillan & Co., 1941, p. 2.
^Ibid.., p . 14.

^Erie Roll, A History of Economic Thought, Englewood
Cliffs, H. J., Prentice-Hall, 1956, p. 383.
4-Hutchison, Review, p. 4-2.
5
^Davenport, Value, p. 354.
-30-

-31when we realize that Jevons channeled his thoughts on dis
tribution in two separate directions; consequently two dis
tinct theories emerge, the first treating consumer alloca
tion and the second, distributive shares.

The discursiveness

with which he attacks these problems is occasionally con
fusing to the reader and often obscures the originality of
his thoughts.

After treating consumer allocation, he

passes directly to the exchange mechanism; further comment
on distribution— as found in his discussion of labor and
capital, for example— is therefore deferred until much
later in the Theory.
Jevons would have done well to adopt Mill's method of
presentation, treating production, distribution, and
exchange in turn; here is a legacy which has been passed on
to twentieth century analysis.

For want of a better, more

systematic method of presentation, the Theory sometimes
suffers; in his readiness to criticize Mill at every oppor
tunity Jevons seems blinded to the fact that Mill1s ,Prin
ciples is far superior to the Theory as regards organization
and topical treatment of economic ideas.

Schumpeter

suggests:
...Perhaps he owed more to Mill than he knew; he
harbored a strong aversion to Mill's Principles,
which he had to use in his teaching'; but Mill's
tergiversations, which are such excellent targets
for rifle practice, may nevertheless have taught
him many t h i n g s . 6

^Schumpeter, History, p. 826.

-52Despite these organizational difficnlties, each of
Jevons' approaches to distribution represents a somewhat
original attempt to extend the marginal utility concept to
the realm of distribution.

The reader will note that only

the first of these theories, as regards consumer allocation,
is treated here.

It is the author’s opinion that Jevons'

other statements on distribution represent a departure from
the main themes of his value theory.

Those who wish to

investigate this subject further should see Appendix B.
As is the ease with many of Jevons' concepts, his
theory of consumer allocation has an archetype; in this
instance it is Gossen's famous Second Law:
...In order to obtain the maximum sum of enjoy
ment, an individual who has a choice between a
number of enjoyments, but insufficient time to
procure all completely, is obliged, however
much the absolute amount of individual enjoy
ments may differ, to procure all partially, even
before he has completed the greatest of them.
The relation between them must be such that, at
the, moment when they are discontinued, the
amounts of all enjoyments are equal.7
In other words maximum utility will result from a uniform
level of "want satisfaction."

(So far as the author can

ascertain, Jevons arrived at this concept quite indepen
dently, and did not discover Gossen's Entwipklung until
eight years after the Theory was first published.) 8

7'Gossen, Entwiekelung, p. 12.
ft

See Jevons, Theory, p. xxxv. Nor was he aware that
Bernouilli had given voice to substantially the same idea
in his "Specimen Theoriae" as early as 1738» (See

-33Reasoning from this principle, Jevons postulates two
eases in which the concept will govern consumer allocation;
the first treats/ the allocation of a single commodity among
various uses; the second, the distribution of a commodity
over time.
(1) Allocation Among Different Uses
By simple illustration Jevons shows how his "Law of
the Variation of the Final Degree of Utility" can be
extended to consumer allocation, given a single commodity
and various means for employing it.

He offers the case of

an "isolated family" which possesses stock s of a commodity
capable of two distinct uses, x-^ and
x^ +

= s_.

^

definition

Rational conduct will dictate that only the

distribution which affords greatest utility will be chosen;
at this point "...an increment of commodity (will) yield
exactly as much utility in one use as in another." 9 A-Hq
and A u^ are given to denote the increments of utility
which arise from the consumption of one more unit of com
modity in uses x-^ and Xg, respectively.

Thus, when the

desired allocation is completed, A u-^ ought to exactly
equal A u^.

To state it another way, at the point of max

imum satisfaction the final degrees of utility in the two
uses will be equal; at the limit the equation appears:
du-.
dx

=

Schumpeter, History, p. 1055)*

du5 ,
dy
^Jevons, Theory, p. 59.

_

where x, y 9X6 equal to x-^,

34
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respectively.

Ceteris par

ibus , this same reasoning will apply to all uses simultane
ously, with the result that all commodities, if consumed
"rationally," will generate maximum utility.

Only under

the rarest circumstances— as in the event of the scarcity
of such an essential grain as barley— would this principle
prove inoperative; in such instances the utility of the
grain as food might far exceed its utility in other uses,
even, Jevons muses, in the production of "alcoholic
liquors."
(2) Allocation of Commodity Over Dime
Jevons also directs his attention to a related alloca
tion problem:

given a single use for commodity, s, and n

days in which to consume it, how can this commodity be con
sumed over time with the greatest utility?

In this

instance the condition for utility maximization would be
written
Vi - v2 = v5 = ... - vn ,
where v^, v^, etc. denote the final degrees of utility on
each day's consumption.

Yet, suppose that the consumer is

uncertain as to how long the stock of commodity will last;
how will uncertainty condition his allocation?

Jevons pro

poses that his future pleasures or pains must be reduced in
proportion to their want of certainty; letting

^

••• En

denote the successively diminishing fractions of uncer
tainty— and again assuming consumer rationality— he obtains

-35the following maximization condition:
v lJ?l

-

y 2^2

=

•• =

^ nP n

•

...The general result is, that as the p r o b a b i l i t y
is less, the commodity assigned to each day is
less, so that v., , its final degree of utility, will
be greater.10
Similarly, the allocation must also account for the varying
influence of an event according to its "propinquity or
remoteness."

Individuals tend to place greater value on

present feelings rather than future feelings which are
absolutely certain to occur.

The above maximization condi

tions must therefore be amended to include some "discount
ing factor."
"by

Jevons designates these fractions of discount

£2 * *** &n *

new maxlmlza‘tl°n equation is

written
v l»l*l

=

r2?2*2

=

***

=

•

...It will be an obvious consequence of these
equations that less commodity will be assigned
to future days in some proportion to the inter
vening time.11
This distribution problem is often faced by ships about to
make a voyage of uncertain duration.

Given the. proper wind

conditions, the vessel might make passage in as little as
ten days; at worst the voyage will extend to as many as
thirty days.

Were the ship's supply of food to be divided

into thirty equal parts, partial starvation would develop
during the first ten days— all this to ward off later evils

10Ibid., p. 72

i:Lrbid., p. 73.

-36which might not even take place.

Yet, consumption of one-

tenth of the food on each of the first ten days might even
he worse, for complete starvation would certainly ensue on
the eleventh day.

The most beneficial distribution would

have to account for two factors:

(1) the law of variation

of the degree of utility of food; and (2) the probability
of each day between the tenth and thirtieth days becoming
part of the voyage.

Jevons suggests that

...the allotments to the first ten days should
be equal. They should afterwards decrease
according to some regular law; for, as the
probability decreases, the final degree of util
ity should increase in inverse p r o p o r t i o n . 12
********
While there is much to be said for Jevons' initial
statement on the distribution process, it is disconcerting
to find that he treats distribution only as regards the
satisfaction of consumers' wants.

For this reason marginal

utility appears important only with regard to consumer
goods and services; virtually nothing is said of the util
ity attaching to the factor inputs used to create these
goods and services.

Schumpeter observes that others—

Gossen and Walras are notable examples— were equally guilty
of this error.

Of all the Austrians only Menger

-...went on to say that means of production— or,
as he called them, 'goods of higher order'—
come within the concept of economic goods by
virtue of the fact that they also yield

1 2 I b i d . ,

p.

?4.

-37consumers ' satisfaction, though only indirectly,
through helping to produce things that do satisfy
consumers' wants directly.13
Menger's generalization of this concept allows us to treat
all factors, of production as "incomplete" consumable goods;
the principle of marginal utility can thus be extended to
include all areas of production and distribution.

More

than anything Jevons' failure to apply this principle to
production theory represents a technical defect in his
writings.

One could easily argue that were it not for the

exigency of readying his Theory for the press in such a
short time, he might have attended to this defect; there
can be no doubt that he had the necessary marginal tools
for handling this.

Yet, to impute any more than this to

Jevons does discredit to Menger and later writers who car
ried marginal analysis beyond the realm of consumption.

15
^Schumpeter, History, pp. 912-13 <>

CHAPTER IV
Marginal Utility and the Exchange Mechanism
- .. .The first problem that Jevons...tackled, by
means of the marginal utility apparatus was the
■ problem of barter. Like (his) 'classic' predec-essors, (Jevons) realized the central position
of exchange value although, also like these pred
ecessors, (he) did not make it sufficiently clear
...that exchange value is but a special form of a
universal coefficient of transformation on the
derivation of which pivots the whole logic of
economic phenomena.1.
Many would argue that at no point in his Theory does
Jevons venture more than a few inches outside the framework
of a static barter economy.

In this sense his visions were

similar to those of his intellectual predecessors.

Yet

others would defend Jevons as both progenitor and prophet
of modern economic theory.

His treatment of exchange

serves as a good instrument for testing the mettle of this
argument, for it is here that the heuristic significance of
Jevonian theory is most evident:

Jevons" "law of indiffer

ence" was later translated into Edgeworth's famous
"indifference-curve" approach to demand analysis;

2

Walras

used Jevons' marginal utility concept as a device for

■^Schumpeter, History, p. 911.
p

Edgeworth, Mathematical Psychics, pp. 28-29.
-
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*
constructing the first general equilibrium systemy even
Marshall unwittingly drew on Jevons' utility theory, transforming it into a doctrine of real cost.

IL

That these and

other men used Jevons" discussion of the exchange mechanism
as a critical springboard for their own deduction would
indicate that, more than anything, the Theory of Political
Economy was important heuristically.
Yet, the author does not mean to imply that Jevons"
treatment of exchange is without its faults; to the con\
trary, his errors are often painfully obvious. In the
first place Jevons lacks a general theory of the determin
ation of prieeso^

At the outset he makes the wrong assump

tion that the principles which govern two-party, twocommodity barter can be applied equally as well to perfectly
competitive exchange.

In making this assumption he fails

to understand the connection between subjective utility
estimation and the formation of market prices.

For the

most part he regards market prices as already "given" and

Leon Walras, Elements of Pure Economics (trans.
William Jaffe), Homewood, 111., Richard D. Irwin, 1954,
pp. 153-164.
IL

Sehumpeter, History, p. 1057*
5
^Robertson
suggests that MacLeod, an economist who
greatly influenced Jevons, actually surpassed Jevons in one
respect: he went beyond value theory to consider the (more
relevant) theory of price determination; it is surprising
that Jevons, a man who relied so heavily on the writings of
MacLeod, therefore, did not also venture into price theory.
See R. M. Robertson, "Jevons and His Precursors," Econometrica, XIX, 1951, pp. 237-238.
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concernedwith them only as they relate to marginal

utility when an equilibrium has been reached
A second major error in Jevons* treatment of exchange
is found in his misuse of mathematics.
7
did not pretend to be a mathematician, '

Admittedly, Jevons
He viewed mathe

matics as an important device for clarifying economic con
cepts, as indeed it is.
often poorly handled.

But his mathematical approach is
Schumpeter observes

...we must see (in Jevons* exchange theory) an
embryonic theory of general equilibrium or, at
all events, a particular form of the unifying
principle that is at the bottom of any generalequilib-rium system. (But the reason he) did not
make it fully articulate (is because he) did not
understand the meaning of a set of simultaneous
equations.. .8
The third major error which Jevons commits is to be
found in the preface to the Theory*s chapter on exchange,
in which he sets about defining certain pertinent economic
terms:

"markets,'* "trading bodies," and the "Law of Indif

ference ."
His definition of the "market" is taken from Cournot
and Cantillon:
.o.By a market I shall mean two or more persons
dealing in two or more commodities, whose stocks

6

See Roll, History, pp. 380-381; also, Hans Mayer,
'Der Erkenntniswert der funktionelien Preistheorien’, Die
Wirtschaftstheorie der Gegenwart, Berlin, Prager, 1932,
pp. 181-182.
7
rSee Jevons, Theory, pp. xiii-xiv.
O
Schumpeter, History, p. 1057-
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of those commodities and intentions of exchang
ing are known to all. It is also essential that
the ratio of exchange between any two persons
should be known to all others. It is only so
far as this community of knowledge extends that
the market e x t e n d s . 9
Hence, by definition, he excludes imperfectly competitive
forces from the market altogether.

Whether or not Jevons

intended to treat these forces at a later date, when he
would have been less pressed for time, is a matter of con
jecture; his deflection from pure theory to statistical
investigations (circa. 1872) would indicate that he did
not propose to extend his analysis to imperfect competi
tion.

At any event, the generalized case of market imper

fections was never formulated.
One might take even greater issue with Jevons’ defin
itions of the "Law of Indifference'1 and "trading bodies."
The former assumes perfect homogeniety of all commodities;
that is to say, any portion of one commodity may be used in
place of any equal portion of another.

Since, ceteris par

ibus , there can be no reason why persons would treat exactly
similar things differently, all portions of a good must be
exchanged at the same ratio in the same market simultane
ously.

In other words

...in the same open market, at any one moment,
there cannot be two prices for the same kind of
article...I propose to eall this The Law of
Indifference, meaning that, when two objects or
commodities are subject to no important

9

Jevons, Theory, pp. 85-86.
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difference as regards the purpose in view, they
will either of them he taken instead of the other
with perfect indifference to the purchaser.10
Once more Jevons is postulating the case of a perfectly
competitive market.

Taken in this eontext, the Law of

Indifference is a useful analytical device.

Yet, in a

"real world" sense, the concept is virtually useless.
Jevons* error is in his assumption that real world and com
petitive analysis were one and the same.

Though he allows

for such factors as defective credit of purchasers, their
imperfect knowledge of the market, etc., these elements are
considered to he extraneous to the market‘d
are excluded from the analysis.

and therefore

Robinson observes that

this was a common error of most writers of the period;
these economists
,..misled by the logical priority of perfect com
petition in their scheme, were somehow trapped
into thinking that it must be of equal importance
in the real world. When they found in the real
world some phenomena...which is inconsistent with
the assumptions of perfect competition, they were
inclined to look for some complicated explanation
of it, before the simple explanation occurred to
them that the real world did not fulfill the
assumptions of perfect competition.12

Ibid., pp. 91-92. Jevons adds that, given these
conditionss "...the ratio of exchange at any moment is
that of dy to dx, of an infinitely small quantity of one
commodity to the infinitely small quantity of another which
is given for it" (ibid., p. 95).
■^Jevons proposes that such factors will produce
"unnatural ratios of exchange" (ibid., p. 86).
12
Joan Robinson, The Economics of Imperfect Competi
tion, London, MacMillan, 194-2, pp. 3-2f»

«43This dichotomy was later realized by Edgeworth, Walras,
Marshall, and Wicksell, who, with varying degrees of suc
cess, attempted to place Jevons' Law of Indifference in a
truer perspective.
Economists are in general agreement that Jevons’ definition of the "trading body" is, at best, clumsy.13
v It is
sketched in the broadest of terms as "...any body either of
buyers or sellers....either an individual or an aggregate
of individuals..." 14 who trade in the open market» Farmers
are a trading body when they sell their produce to millers;
millers are one when they sell flour to bakers; and so
forth.

Jevons looked on this concept as a natural out

growth of the Law of Indifference:

each trading body is

indifferent to choosing any single homogeneous commodity
over an identical one with the result that a single price
prevails.

Each trading body has an effect on the market

and, in turn, is affected by the market.
The present author cannot accept Jevons' trading body
concept for at least two reasons.

In the first place it

completely obscures the distinction between barter and

13
^Young notes that if this concept "were taken in any
literal sense the market could not be supposed to be com
petitive. With all the millers and all the bakers in Eng
land conceived rigidly as a single pair of traders, the
'law of indifference' could not be invoked, and the equa
tion of exchange would not lead to a determinate ratio of
exchange" ("Jevons' Theory," p. 586). See also Eckard,
Economics, p. 21; Roll, History, pp. 581-382.
14

Jevons, Theory, pp. 88-89.
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II

competitive exchange.

Are we to assume— as Jevons does

time and again— that the very same conditions hold irre
spective of the number of commodities or parties to
exchange? 15
x So the concept would imply. Or can we accept
Jevons' inference that the conditions of equilibrium are
satisfied by a single price?"^

Again, decidedly not.

We

must agree with Hutchison, who suggests that Jevons appar
ently
...intended to make one model cover both two-
party and two-eommodity barter, and a competitive
market in a monetary economy. As a result neither
case gets clearly formulated.17
Even more inadmissible is Jevons8 implication that freely
competitive exchange leads to some sort of social welfare.
1ft
maximization.
He infers that, since barter equilibrium
gives rise to maximum satisfaction for two individuals, com
petitive equilibrium will fulfill this condition for any
number of parties.

Ihis curious extention of Gossen's

Second Law is a convenient device which Jevons uses to
prove the universality of his exchange equations.

But this

device is both unnecessary and illogical.
It is to these and other points which we now turn.

~^See Knut Wicksell, Uber Wert, Kapital und Rente,
London, London School of Economics Reprints, 1933» P« 48.
■^See Roll, History, p. 381.
17'Hutchison, Review, pp. 42-4-3.
■^See Roll, History, p. 385»

-45(l) Simple Two-Party, Two-Commodity Exchange
........The keystone of the whole Theory of Exchange
and of the principle problems of Economics, lies
in this proposition— the ratio of exchange of
.....any two commodities will be the reciprocal of the
ratio of the final degrees of -utility of the
quantities of commodity available for consumption
after the exchange is completed.T9
As the most basic of all economic processes, 20 exchange
can assume many forms, the simplest of which involves two
trading bodies exchanging two commodities.

Trading body A

will exchange some portion of his commodity for a certain
portion of trading body B's commodity, with the result that
a gain in utility is effected for both parties.

The terms

of the exchange will be defined by the respective utility
functions of the two traders; for example, if ten pounds of
corn are given for one of beef, this implies that the owner
of corn considers ten pounds of his commodity to be less
useful than one of beef.

The same holds true for the owner

of beef, as regards his commodity.

The process of exchange

will be terminated only after no further gain can be
realized:
...This point of equilibrium will be known by the
criterion, that an infinitely small amount of com
modity exchanged in addition, at the same rate,
will bring neither gain nor loss of utility.21

19
Jevons, Theory, p. 95« See also Jevons' letter to
Professor Walras (May 12, 1874) in Letters and Journal,
pp. 502-304.
20

See Jevons, Theory, p. 75*

21Ibid., p. 96.

Jevons utilizes a diagram to show the process by which this
equilibrium is reached:

FIGURE II

m.

In Figure II the curve pqr represents a small portion of
the utility function for commodity A, while the broken
curve, p 8qr*, is a similar curve for commodity Bo

This lat

ter curve has been reversed and superimposed on the former
one so that, while quantities of commodity A are measured
from point a to point b, the quantities of commodity B are
measured from b to a.

Assuming units of both commodities

to be represented by equal lengths, we see that line aa1
represents an increase of commodity A, but a decrease of
commodity B*
For the sake of simplicity Jevons proposes that the
ratio of exchange is 1:1, so that, for example, by receiving commodity a'a a person gains utility ad, and loses
utility ale; hence, the net gain in utility is cd and the

-47individual will wish, to extend the exchangee
Jevons asks.

But how far?

Were this individual to continue it as far as

point bj_, and he were still proceeding, through the next
small exchange he would receive utility he.

But in so

doing he loses utility b 1f , which implies a net loss of ef.
Obviously he has gone too far, and should have discontinued
the exchange at point £, the point of greatest advantage or
"maximum utility."

Beyond this equilibrium point net gain

becomes net loss, with disutility as a result.
Jevons demonstrates how this first case of exchange
might be translated into a simple "calculus." 22

He reverts

to the notations which were used in his treatment of dis
tribution; that is, 6 x

represents a small increment of

one commodity (corn) and A y , a small increment of another
commodity (beef) given for it.

If both are homogeneous

commodities, the Law of Indifference will prevail:
will be to A x

as y, the whole quantity

ofbeef, is

^ y
to x,

the whole quantity of corn; or
A

L
A X

=

_X_

•

X

Jevons then incorrectly23
^ assumes that

by multiplying each

22 "Jevons calls his mathematical processes calculus,
but they correspond to the processes now taughtin algebra"
(Eckard, Economics, p. 18).
23Eckard questions Jevons" mathematical reasoning:
"The expression a y = y discloses the relationship, adeA X

X

quately, but when he multiplies each side of the equation

-48side of the equation by A x , he is able to obtain a sim
ilar relationship:
^ 7
r

■

= JLA x *
x

'

This equation would imply that A y , the increment of beef,
is
for

y
x

times as great as A x , the increment of corn;, then,
their utilities to be equal, thedegree of utility of

beef must be

x

times

as great as the degree of utility of

1

corn:
oouThus we arrive at the principle that the
degrees of utility of commodities exchanged will
be in the inverse proportion ofthe magnitudes
of the increments exchanged0
Exchange will alter both the holdings of commodity and
the degrees of utility of the exchanging parties <> Suppose
that the total quantity of corn is a and the total quantity
of beef, b.

In the process of exchange x of corn is given

for 2 °f beef; after it is terminated the eorn owner holds
a - x of corn and y of beef, while the beef-owner holds x
of corn and b - y of bee.f0

The utility functions may be

designated as follows:
0^(4 - x) = final degree of utility of corn to the
eorn-owner;
by A x .»ohe destroys the relationship between a x and a y .
This operation can be carried on, correctly, only with num
bers, which is to say, abstract ideasc An increment of corn
cannot be multiplied by a relationship between a quantity of
corn and a quantity of beef!" (ibido, p. 23)°
24 Jevons, Theory, p. 100„

-4-90 2X = final degree of utility of eorn to the beefowner;
=

final degree of utility of beef to the eornowner;

2^

~ 7") = final degree of utility of beef to the
beef-owner.

•Therefore, the corn-owner will not be satisfied until the
following equilibrium condition is fulfilled:
0 -j^Ca - x)

’ dx

0 1(a - x)

Assuming, as before, that

dy
dx

=
=

=

° dy;

or

dy .

y , Jevons substitutes
x

for the second member of this equation, and obtains an
equation which represents the equilibrium condition which
faces the owner of corn:

y

iy

Pari passu, what holds true for the corn-owner must like
wise hold true for the beef-owner:
^ 2^

“ y) ° dy

= <j>2*

° d x V;

or, by substitution:
0

2*

= _z_ •
x

...We arrive, then, at the conclusion, that when
ever two commodities are exchanged for each other,
and more or less can be given or received in
infinitely small quantities, the quantities

exchanged satisfy two equations, which may he thus
stated in a concise form—
0 x(a - y)
y q y

=

_2_

=

x

0 2x

.25
J)

Jevons proposes that these two equations alone are suffi
cient to determine the results of all forms of perfectly
competitive exchange:

it is simply a matter-of solving for

the "unknowns," in this case, x and y, the amounts supplied
and demanded.

The important notion that conditions of

exchange might he represented hy simultaneous equations
dates back as early as Mill:
...the idea of a ratio, as between demand and sup
ply, is out of place, and has no concern in the
matter: the proper mathematical analogy is that
of an equation. Demand and supply, the quantity
demanded and the quantity supplied, will he made
equal. If unequal at any moment, competition
equalizes them, and the manner in which this is
done is by an adjustment of the value.27
Jevons credits Mill with having first noticed this, while
25
Ibid. In his discussion of Jevons' final equations
of exchange, Roll notes that "he nowhere explained how
these collective marginal utilities were determined. In
fact, what he was considering was a case of isolated
exchange, in which it is now admitted that the actual ratio
of exchange is indeterminate within certain limits. It was
left to Walras and others to show the connection between
marginal utility, demand, and price under competitive con
ditions" (Roll, History, p. 382).
26Stigler observes that "quite aside from the ambig
uous concept of the trading body, this procedure was
illicit on (Jevons1) own view that utilities of different
individuals are not comparable" (Stigler, "Utility Theory,"
p.

319).

2^Mill, Principles, p. 448.
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at the same time criticizing him for not having shown how,
given a discrepancy between supply and demand, they are
ultimately brought into equilibrium.

Another flaw in

Mill's reasoning is his implication that exchange condi
tions ean be stated in a single equation, when, in actual
ity, at least two equations are requisite.

The symbol x in.

Jevons1 final exchange equations (above) represents quan
tity demanded on one side and quantity supplied on the
other; and similarly for symbol y.

If these two equations

are simultaneously true, according to Jevons, then..„the x
and y of one equation will equal those of the other and
the equilibrium exchange condition will be met.

"...The

laws of supply and demand are thus a result of...the true
po

theory of value or exchange."
(2) Exchange Between Two Trading Bodies of Unequal Size
The implicit assumption that all trading bodies are of
equal size is unnecessary; indeed, if exchange analysis is
to approach real world conditions, this assumption must be
discarded.

So long as commodities are capable of infinite

pQ
Jevons, Theory, p. 101. At this point Jevons
appears to come closest to understanding the true relation
ship between supply and demand, and their equality in equi
librium. This implication is again made in Appendix V of
the Theory when he admits having employed "intersecting
(supply and demand) eurves to illustrate the determination
of the market price in...lectures at Owens College (1863)."
(Ibid., p. 333) Why Jevons did not include such diagrams
in the Theory cannot be ascertained. Recent correspondence
with the British Museum indicates that the 1863 lectures
have not been preserved (see Appendix C, p. 118).

subdivision, the basie principles of exchange remain the
same::
...We may, firstly, express the conditions of a
great market where vast quantities of some stock
are available, so that any one small trader will
not appreciably affect the ratio of exchange.
This ratio is, then, approximately a fixed num
ber, and each trader exchanges at that ratio just
so much as suits him.29
Let A be the trading body possessing two very large stocks
of commodities, a and b.

The other trading body, C, holds

a comparatively small quantity, c, of the second commodity
and exchanges a portion of it, y--which is very small com
pared with b— for portion x of a— which is very small com
pared with a.

When the exchange is completed A will hold

quantities a - x and b + y ; conversely, C will hold x and
c - y.

This is shown by the equation:
01>

~
+ y)

“ I ~
<t> 2X
x
-y-2 (c - y)

.

Assuming that a - x and b + y are roughly equivalent to a
and b, respectively, it is possible to substitute the lat
ter quantities and obtain the equation:
0

ja

yrib

=

y

»

m

,

~

where m is given as the existing ratio of exchange.
Under these circumstances the ratio of exchange is

29 Ibid., p. 112. In terms of modern theory Jevons is
postulating the case of an individual firm in a perfectly
competitive industry.

-53determined by the conditions facing trading body A and is
comparatively fixed.

Therefore, only one unknown quantity,

x, must be solved for;

this quantity will be purchased by

C in exchange for some portion of

The actual amount of

c which is given in exchange will be determined by the
equation: ^
$ la
\jj-.Lb

=

<t> 2X
y 2 (c - mx)

.

An even simpler exchange equation can be given to rep
resent most of a consumer's daily purchases.

Generally

speaking, an individual will desire so little of a given
commodity, such as salt, that he will give up only a small
percentage of his possessions in order to obtain it.

Sup

pose that y (i*1 the above equation) represents only a very
small part of c.

In this case ojf2 ^e ~ ^

will roughly

express the conditions of exchange:
0 2X

-

'Vr2C
or

0 2X

=

1 ° 'Vr2e°

Trading body C ’s exchange pattern will follow this general
law:

he will purchase the commodity until its degree of
7)0
^ "This

equation represents the position of an indi
vidual consumer with regard to the aggregate trade of a
large community, since he must buy at the current prices,
which he cannot in an appreciable degree effect." Ibid.,
p. 115.

-54utility falls below that of the commodity which he must
give up:
...in the above equation

m

represents the

utility to him of a penny, which being an incon
siderable fraction of his possessions, is approx
imately invariable in utility, and he buys salt
until 0 2 x » which is approximately the utility of
the next pound, is equal to, or it may be some
what less than that of the penny.31
However the same reasoning cannot be applied to the case of
those purchases which form a large part of an individual's
total consumption.

This is especially true in the case of

a poor family which is about to purchase a significant com
modity such as meat.

Only after they have secured a suffi

cient quantity of meat will the final degree of utility of
this commodity begin to diminish:
...The more they buy, the lower the final degree
of utility of the meat, and the higher the final
degree of utility of something else; and thus
these purchases will be the more narrowly
limited.32
(3) Multi-Commodity Exchange Among Numerous Trading Bodies
An unfortunate assumption which Jevons makes is that
the same principles which govern barter can be applied with
equal facility to multi-commodity exchange among any number
of competing parties:
^1
Ibid., p. 114. Jevons implies the demand for salt
is less than perfectly elastic within a narrowly defined
range below the market price.
52Ibid.

...Exactly the same principles hold true, however
numerous and complicated may be the conditions.
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^■tle respective functions of utility for B.
the respective functions of utility for C.36

When exchange is completed A will hold the quantity
a - x1 - x2 of cotton and y^ of silk; B, in turn, will pos
sess x-^ of cotton and b -

- y2 °f silk.

The actual

ratio of exchange is y^ for x^, and will be determined by a
pair of equations:
1
—1
M
1

—1
1

- x2 )

=
I1

X1

I7!

=

2X1
l/r 2(b - *1
<P

"

1 2)

Other equations will apply to the exchanges between A
- xi - x2)

<b
X

=

izi

Z1
x2

Jx2
3<-c - zi - z2)
4>

=

X

And similarly for interchange between B and C.
ijr

2^

=

2Z2

z2
^2

“

y r 5y2
1
i
—1
N
1
O
roi

H

" 7i - j 2 y

Zg.)

Even the most complex exchanges may be decomposed into these
simple eases, Jevons argues.

It is merely a matter of con

sidering every exchange as a process which gives rise to
two equations, and solving for the quantities involved.
Underlying this analysis is the assumption that all commod
ities are infinitely divisible; the condition of indivisi
bility is treated later in Jevons’ Theory as one of several
impediments to exchange.

56rbid., p. 116.

-57(-4) Competition in Exchange: 3 Trading Bodies
...One case of the Theory of Exchange is of consid
erable importance, and arises when two parties com
pete together in supplying a third party with a
certain commodity.37
Imagine a situation in which trading body A, again in
possession of quantity a of his commodity, is willing to
exchange a portion of it for another commodity which both B
and C possess; in amounts b and c, respectively.

Suppose

that A gives up x-^ of his stock, a, to B, and x2 to G.
exchange A will receive

of b (from B), and y2

In

£

(from C)» Assuming perfect homogeniety of commodity, we
obtain a single ratio of exchange, based on the Law of
Indifference:

yl =
x2

J2

0

(1)

x2

So long as he receives the right commodity in the right
amounts, trading body A will be indifferent as to its
source. All hecares about is that
in return forsurrendering

he receives

+ x2

y-^ + y2

. Therefore:

yl + y2 = _£l_ .
X1 + x2
X1
A will terminate the exchange only when the ratio of the
final degrees of utility of the two commodities (a, and
b,c) exactly equate the reciprocal of the ratio of exchange,
as stated above:
^ Ibid., p. 117«
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l(a - ?X - x2>

-

■

(2)

X1

+ *2>

The same principle must also hold for both B and C:

0 2X1

" JV;

'xfrz^0 - ^

xi

(j) 3X2

y2
x2

” 3^2^

(3)
.

(4-)

A solution of these four equations would involve determina
tion of the values of the four unknowns, x^, x^, y-p J 2
(5) Impediments to Exchange:

■

Transport Costs

The problem of formulating the principles of exchange
is made no less difficult by the existence of certain ele
ments which act to impede the exchange process.

Included

in these ’’impediments to exchange" are such factors as
transport costs, charges of brokers, agents, packers, etc.,
/

and customs duties.

All these charges and more will tend

to reduce the advantages of commerce in this respect:

such

costs will usually be proportional to the quantity of com
modity, and, if expressed in money, can be considered as
some part of the commodity which must be subtracted if
exchange is to occur; trading bodies will therefore have
less commodity at their disposal.

Thus, if trading body A

gives trading body B commodity x, the latter receives only
part of this commodity, mx; the actual quantity of commod
ity he receives will depend upon the fraction, m, which
represents transport costs.

B will terminate the exchange

only when

<j) 2 ( i a x )
I X

Similarly, A will receive only ny in exchange, where n
denotes the charges applied to y.

In equilibrium
X

The existence of transport charges will require that two
ratios of exchange be established; the greater the discrep
ancy between these ratios, the less advantage there will be
to exchange.
(6 ) Equivalence of Commodities
A special case of exchange will develop whenever two
different commodities are applicable to the same uses:
consumers of meats such as beef and mutton often appear
almost indifferent to choosing one over another, with the
result that their mutual ratio of exchange is practically
invariable.

Such commodities, to use Jevons* phrasing,

are "more or less" reciprocally substitutable and the
degree of substitutability will depend upon each good's
final

degree

of

utility.

In

18?1

the

m u t t o n - b e e f

ratio

was

approximately 9 to 8 , which would indicate that, while
these commodities were nearly substitutable, people tended
to place a slightly higher valuation on mutton:
...It follows that (if) the final degrees of
utility of these meats are in this ratio, or
that if (f) x be the degree of utility of mutton

-

60

-

and 'ijfj that of beef, we have
8 - *0 x

.

9

‘o/ry.58

This then is the condition for the optimum allocation of
consumer expenditures;

in seeking to maximize his util

ity, a consumer will equate the ratio of the marginal util
ities of the two goods with the ratio of their respective
prices.3 9
Jevons was aware that under "rare" circumstances this
equation would not fulfill the conditions for utility maxi
mization:
oo.if mutton became comparatively scarce, there
would probably be some persons willing to pay a
higher price merely because it would then be
considered a delicacy.40
The ultimate result of such conditions would be that the
discrepancy between the prices of mutton and beef would

■lbi'd., p. 135. Stigler observes that Jevons, m
defining "substitutes" in terms of the constancy of the
ratio of their marginal utilities, "was inconsistent, for
he treated the marginal utility of X-^ as dependent only on
the quantity of X^ in his general theory, whereas X^ and X^
are "equivalent," the marginal utility of X-^ depends also
on the quantity of X O n e cannot define the usual rela
tionships among the utilities of commodities with an addi
tive utility function.00" (Stigler, "Utility Theory," p.384).
XQ
^ This

differs from the modern optimum allocation
position in an important respect: whereas Jevons speaks of
equating price ratios with utility ratios, the present-day
economist avoids the utility concept and is more concerned
with the relative preferences of consumers. This would
require that price ratios be equated with the marginal
rate of substitution of commodities, i.e., the quantity of
one good which would ^ust compensate a consumer for the
loss of a marginal -unit of another good. See Appendix A,
p. 103.
40
Jevons, Theory, p. 135»

-61become even greater and, strictly speaking, these goods
could no longer be regarded as near-perfect substitutes.
However, he adds, this must be regarded as an extreme case.
The more general rule is that
...the conditions of supply will have no effect
upon the ratio of exchange; we must, in fact,
treat beef and mutton as one commodity of two
different strengths, just as gold at eighteen
and gold at twenty carats are hardly considered
as two but rather as one commodity.^1
(7)

E x c h a n g e

I n d e t e r m i n a c y

Jevons* faith in the efficacy of his exchange equa
tions is unyielding only to a point; in a somewhat discur
sive section of the Theory— entitled “Failure of the Equa
tions of Exchange"— he admits that, owing to various
parametric shifts in the conditions of exchange, it is
possible to show several cases in which the exchange equa
tions are inoperative.

In the first place he postulates a

case in which the utility functions of two trading bodies
are so dissimilar as to preclude the existence of any
trade at all:

41 Ibid. Eckard observes that this statement is
inconsistent with Jevons* principle of diminishing util
ity: "If the supply of beef fell off, people could only
get more mutton by paying a higher price, unless the sup
ply of mutton were perfectly elastic at the existing
price. Hence, the conditions of supply do affect the
ratios of exchange; for if mutton is produced under
increasing cost, a higher price must be paid to call
forth an additional quantity" (Economics. p. 24). Only
under certain rarefied conditions.would the ratios of
exchange of two substitutes remain the same, although

-62may happen that the commodity possessed by
A has a high degree of utility to A, and a low
degree to B, and that vice versa B's commodity
has a high degree of utility to B and less to A . ^2
Jevons maintains that, given these conditions, even though
B receives a very small amount of A's commodity, the final
degree of utility of this increment to him will be less
than that attaching to his own commodity.

Exchange will

then benefit neither party and solution to the equations of
exchange is indeterminate.
Conversely, under different circumstances A may
exchange its entire commodity with B (and vice versa) and
still the equations may fail:
...A may have so low a desire for consuming his
own commodity, that the very last increment of
it has less degree of utility to him than a small
addition to the commodity received in e x c h a n g e .^3
In this

instance each trading body desires the last incre

ment of the good received more than it desires the last
increment given; a determinate solution is again impossible.
Another parametric change occurs when Jevons drops his
initial assumption that all commodities are subject to

Jevons fails to realize this.
Perhaps it is a minor point, but the author would also
take issue with Jevons9 analogy in the above statement:
eighteen carat gold is easily converted into twenty carat
gold, whereas such transformation is obviously impossible
in the ease of mutton and beef.
42
Jevons, Theory, p.-H9o

-63infinite divisibility.

This is obviously a more realistic

assumption, especially as regards such discrete items of
exchange as buildings and equipment.

In the first place

he postulates the case of two parties, each of which is in
the possession of a single indivisible commodity, as, for
instance, a book.
•

They are confronted with the problem of
)

-•

exchanging the whole commodities or doing without exchange
completely.

In this instance it is total utility, rather

than final degree of utility, which is significant.

Desig

nating total utilities in the following way
u-^

=

u2

=

the utility of A's book to A,
"

"

A's "

to B,

=

"

"

"

B's "

to A,

=

"

"

°

B ’s "

to B,

A|

v2

!\

Jevons concludes that exchange will occur only if
(1) v-^ > u^

and

(2)

u2 > v2 . y

Should one or both of these conditions not be fulfilled,
there would be no reason for exchange to take place.
More complex problems can arise when an indivisible
commodity if offered for one which is perfectly divisible;
a good example of this situation is found in the case of
Russia's sale of Alaska, an indivisible "commodity,'1 for
American dollars, a divisible "commodity."
iLlL

Ibid., p. 121.

^Ibid.

In this

-64instance the problem is determinate only within certain
defined limits.
Another case could develop— and frequently does in
retail trade— in which commodities are divisible, but insuf
ficiently so.

Commodities such as paper and wine are com

monly produced in convenient, though discrete, units; to
subdivide these units is to destroy the commodity com
pletely.

This problem would face a person buying ink.

He

must always weigh the total utility of a single bottle
against the total utility of the shilling he gives for it,
as illustrated in Figure III: 46
Y

t

FIGURE III

x

X

In the above diagram the total utilities attaching to suc
cessive bottles of ink are shown by the spaees
P2Uj» etc., whereas total utilities of successive shillings
are Or^, P]^, etc.

Obviously, the individual will purchase

no more than three bottles; were he to purchase the fourth

^6Ibid., p. 126.

-65bottle the individual would make the disadvantageous sacri
fice of shilling p^r^r^p^.

So again the equations of

exchange prove operative only within a reasonably welldefined area.
Once having formulated these eases, Jevons emphati
cally cautions the reader against accepting commodity indi
visibility as the more general case.

It is his contention

that in practically all business dealings— especially in
the area of international trade between great industrial
nations— more or less commodity might be obtained in infi
nitely small quantities.
(8) Footnotes to Exchange;

The "True11 Origin of Value

As an architect of utilitarian economics Jevons is
always quick to criticize what he viewed as imperfections
in the basic framework of the science.

However discursive

his writings may appear at times, there can be no doubt
that they reflect, above all, an attempt to smash the
Classical labor theory idol.
Almost an entire century had passed since Adam Smith,
the acknowledged progenitor of Classical economics, had
spelled out the role of labor-cost in the determination of
value.

The wealth of nations, he proposed, is occasioned

...first, by the skill, dexterity, and judgment
with which (a country's) labour is generally
applied; and, secondly, by the proportion
between the number of those who are employed in

—66use ful labour, and that of those who are not so
employed.^
Using Smith's theory as a point of departure, virtually
every economist during the early part of the nineteenth
century set about discovering the "true" origins of value.
In his Principles of Political Economy (1820) Malthus
defined value in terms of the "amount of stored and cur
rent labor" and utilized this definition to develop the
concept of effective demand. 4-8 Torrens extended the labor
theory to include capital, which he considered a type of
"accumulated labor." 4-9
J Similar statements were given by
47'Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes
of the Wealth of NationsT New York, Modern Library, 1937$
p . lvii.
48 "It is obvious...that in the same place, and at the
same time, the different quantities of day labour which
different commodities can command, will be exactly in pro
portion to their relative values in exchange; and if any
two of them will purchase the same quantity of labour of
the same description, they will invariably exchange with
each other" (Thomas Malthus, Principles of Political Economy, New York, A. M. Kelley, 1951$ P° 94)»
49 "Thus, from the perpetually operating law of com
petition. ..it inevitably follows, that after the community
divides itself into a class of capitalists and a class of
labourers, the results obtained by the employment of
equivalent capitals or equal quantities of accumulated
labour, will be equal in exchangeable value" (Robert Tor
rens, Essay on the Production of Wealth, London, Longmans,
1821, p . 63). The concept of "accumulated labour" was not
wholly original with Torrens and can be traced to Smith,
who made implicit references to it in his discussion of
productive vs. unproductive labor; see Smith, Wealth,

pp. 194-195•

-67his contemporaries, James Mill 50 and McCulloch, 51 and do
not need to be repeated here.

Perhaps the most controver

sial variation on the labor theory belongs to Marx, whose
"surplus value" concept forms the cornerstone of his famous
Dialectic. 52 The important point is that each of these
writers sought to explain value in terms of the labor
involved in the production of a given commodity, rather
than the subjective valuations which individuals place upon
a commodity.

This is not to imply, however, that these men

wholly rejected the subjective-utility element.

Ricardo

and J. S. Mill, two of the foremost exponents of the labor
theory, suggest that, while utility cannot be used as a
measure of value, it is nevertheless essential to value:
...possessing utility, commodities derive their
exchangeable value from two sources: from
their scarcity, and from the quantity of labour
required to obtain them.55
Ricardo implies that the first source is of somewhat lesser
importance than the second:

there are only a few

50See James Mill's Elements of Political Economy,
^
London, Longmans, 1821, pT
^■^See J. R. McCulloch's Principles of Political Econ
omy, Edinburgh, A. & C. Black, 1849, pp. 572-575Surplus-value is produced by the employment of
labour power. Capital buys the labour power and pays wages
for it. By means of his work the labourer creates new
value which does not belong to him, but to the capitalist"
(Earl Marx, Capital, New fork, Modern Library, 1952,
p. 59)»
^David Ricardo, Principles of Political Economy and
Taxation, New York, MacMillan Company, 1921, p. 2.

-68commodities
o..the value of which is determined by their
scarcity alone. No labour can increase the quan
tity of such goods (as rare statues and pictures),
and therefore their value cannot be lowered by an
increased supply.5^
The more general case is that labor, both "current" and
"stored up," will determine value. 55
^
It was upon the basis of this apparent discrepancy^56
that Jevons built his case against Classical value theory:
value cannot at one time be attributed to one cause and,

54Ibid.
55
^Ricardo,
unlike many of his contemporaries, realized
that labor itself was subject to variation. This required
a modification of his earlier hypothesis that value was
exactly proportional to the amount of labor embodied in the
production of a given commodity. At first glance this mod
ification appears tautological: one wonders how it is pos
sible that labor, as the single most important cause of
value, is itself amenable to unequal valuation. Eric Roll
suggests that Ricardo's modification is a legitimate one:
"Value remains determined by current and stored-up labour
whether the latter belongs to the labourer or not. The
only difference is that in the latter case the value of the
product which is appropriated by the capitalist is divided
into two parts, one which pays the wages of the labourer,
the other which is the capitalist's profit" (Roll, History,
pp. 178-179)o See also George Stigler, "Ricardo and the
93% Labor Theory of Value," American Economic Review,
XLVIII, June, 1958.
56There can be no doubt that Jevons' interpretation of
Classical theory was often incorrect. At one point in his
work, for example, he chides Ricardo for his implication
that all labor is of uniform quality./# (This was an incor
rect interpretation of Ricardo, as noted earlier.) Jevons
concludes that it is
...impossible to compare a priori the productive
powers of a nawy, a carpenter, an iron puddler,
a school master, and a barrister (Jevons,

-69at other times, to another;
...The mere fact that there are many things, such
as rare ancient books...which have high values,
and which are absolutely incapable of production
now, disperses the notion that value depends upon
labour. Even those things which are producible
in any quantity by labour seldom exchange exactly
at the corresponding values.5?
By way of illustration Jevons cites the case of the (then)
recently-completed Great Western Railway, the production
of which required the services of a vast quantity of
laborers.

The value attaching to. such a project cannot

depend, however, upon the quantity of labor employed, but
rather upon the number of persons who find the railway use
ful.

Jevons felt that with the passage of time fewer and

fewer people would find it useful and the total utility of
the railway would eventually sink to zero.

On the other

hand an undertaking such as the Atlantic Cable could have a
value far exceeding the amount of labor expended on it, at
least for a time.

It is therefore impossible to define

value in terms of labor cost:
•°°labour once spent has no influence on the
future value of any article; it is gone and

Theory, p. 166).
Given this assumption, Jevons proposes that the value of
labor must ultimately be determined by the value of the
produce, rather than vice versa. In other words, contrary
to earlier statements by Ricardo and Mill, the value of
labor is price-determined. (Eckard notes the parallelism
between the above statement by Jevons and Gairnes* theory
of reciprocal demand. See Eckard, Economies, p. 35*)
57

Jevons, Theory, p. 163 •

-70lq,st forever. In commerce “bygones are for ever
bygones; and we are always starting clear at each
moment, judging the values of things with a view
of'future utility.58
Yet the labor element must not be discounted entirely;
though never the cause of value, labor is indirectly the
determining factor in many instances:
...Value depends solely on the final degree of
utility. How can we vary this degree of util
ity?— By having more or less of the commodity to
consume. And how shall we get more or less of
it?— By spending more or less labour in obtain
ing a supply.59
lo summarize Jevons presents the famous value catena:
...Cost of production determines supply;
Supply determines final degree of utility:
Final degree of utility determines value. 80
Ihe end result is that value depends upon the conditions of
demand in relation to a given supply; in this respect
Jevons® position is antithetical to the position of those
Classicists who treated changes in supply relative to a
fixed demand.
As will be demonstrated in PART II, Jevons® value
chain, with its simple causal relationships, is, like many
of Jevons' statements on value and exchange, incorrect; but
it is defective more in technique than in substance.

It

58lbid., p. 164.
59Ibid., p. 165o
8QIbid. It was this statement which prompted Keynes
to comment that Jevons "chiselled in stone where Marshall
knits in wool" (Keynes, Essays, p. 144).

-71remained for Alfred Marshall to pick away at the splinters
of technical error which Jevons had unintentionally left in
an -unfinished building.

PART II

MARSHALLIAN CRITICISM

Jevons saw the kettle boil and cried out with
the delighted voice of a child; Marshall too
had seen the kettle boil and sat down silently
to build an engine„
John Maynard Keynes

CHAPTER V

The Marshallian Compromise
0ooThere are few writers of modern times who
have approached as near to the brilliant origin
ality of Ricardo as Jevons has done0 But he
appears to have judged both Ricardo and Mill
harshly, and to have attributed to them doc
trines narrower and less scientific than those
which they really heldcl
Having already displayed the implements of devonian
marginal utility analysis, we must now demonstrate the man
ner in which Jevons’ major contemporary critic, Alfred
Marshall, tested their mettle„2 Of the many channels into
which Marshall siphoned his assessments of the Jevonian
theory, four were stressed and will concern us here:
(1) Marshall's proposition that while English "classical11
thought was defective in a number of aspects, its major

"^Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics, London,
MacMillan & Co„, 1898, p» ^ 6 6 a
2

Marshall wins the title of Jevons' "major critic" by
default: just as he had no major pupils, Jevons likewise
had no major critics (i.e„, reviewers), in the same sense
as Mill was the great critic of Ricardo, Marshall of Mill,
and Keynes of Marshall„ The first of Marshall's criti
cisms of Jevons appeared as a review of the Theory of
Political Economy in Academy, April 1, 1872<> (See reprint
in Memorials of Alfred Marshall, A. Go Pigou, ed», Hew
York, Kelley and Millman, 1956, ppc 93“100o) Brief refer
ences to Jevons' work also were given in Marshall's Eco
nomics of Industry, London, MacMillan & Co», 1901,
“73“

tenets were fundamentally correct and heuristically signif
icant; (2) his contention that Jevonian criticisms of
classical analysis were to a large extent an outgrowth of
misreading of the older doctrine; (3) his remonstrance
against Jevons for overemphasizing demand forces without
regard for the equally significant elements of real cost
and supply; and (4) the perfunctory commendation which he
accorded to Jevons for having polished the utility side of
the value coin*

3

Schooled in the classical tradition, Marshall dis
played a profound disregard for the iconoclasm of Jevons
and the Austrian School in his early years*

At the age of

thirty he was asked hy the editors of Academy to review
Jevons" Theory:
oooMy youthful loyalty to (Ricardo) boiled over
when I read Jevons9 Theory*,»,1 have a vivid mem
ory of the angry phrases which would force them
selves into my draft (of the review), only to be
cut out and then reappear in another form a lit
tle later on, and then to be cut out again.^

pp* 185, 242; Money Credit and Commerce, London, MacMillan
& Co., 1924, pp* 20, 29, 279-280* The only "extended"
criticism appears in Marshall's Principles', especially
pp* 566-570*
^See Schumpeter, History, pp* 920-922*
4
Memorials, p. 100* There were three other major
reviews of the Theory; by John Elliot Cairnes in the
Fortnightly Review, Simon Newcomb in the North American
Review, and an anonymous writer in the Saturday Review.
All differ in tone: only Cairnes0 and Newcomb's could be
called favorable* (See Howey, Marginal Utility School,
pp * 62-63•)

-75Time and several reevaluations of Jevons" work tended to
modify Marshall's feelings; a quarter of a century after
his initial appraisal appeared Marshall wrote:
...1 looked with great excitement for Jevons"
Theory; but he gave me no help in my difficul
ties and I was vexed. I have since learnt to
estimate him better. His manysidedness, his
power of combining statistical with analytical
investigations, his ever fresh honest sparkling
individuality and suggestiveness impressed me
gradually; and I reverence him now as among the
very greatest of economists.5
This ehange in attitude on the part of Marshall cannot
be called conciliatory; rather, it represents a recognition
of the great theoretical similarity between the works of
the two authorsSchumpeter writes:
„„.Marshall"s theoretical structure, barring its
technical superiority and various developments
of detail, is fundamentally the same as that of.
Jevons, but...the rooms in this new house are
unnecessarily cluttered up with Ricardian heir
looms, which receive emphasis quite out of pro
portion to their operational importance.6
This statement points to several significant questions
which will form the substance of our diagnosis of Marshal
lian criticism:

firstly, to what extent was Marshall's

evaluation engendered by his disapproval of Jevonian tech(r:

nique, rather than by the actual substance of Jevons'
Theory?

And secondly was Marshall so enamoured with

5
^Memorials, p. 99. Bespite his change in attitude,
Marshall mentioned Jevons less than two dozen times in the
later editions of Principles.
6Schumpeter, History, p. 837°

classicism and. the ’’heirlooms" in its workshop that he was
unable to discern the many technical errors which even the
classicists had committed?

Critical points to be touched

on in our discussion of this latter question include:
(1) the importance of "real cost" factors; (2) Jevons' use
of mathematics; (3) the ethical implications of the hedon
istic calculus ; and (4-) Jevons* incomprehension of the role
of economic time periods.
A.

Marshall and Jevonian Technique
In his Essays and Sketches in

Biography

John Maynard

Keynes makes an analogy which neatly sums up the essential
7
difference between Jevonian and Marshallian technique:'
...Jevons' Theory....(as) the first modern book
on economics...(is) simple, lucid, unfaltering,
chiselled in stone where Marshall knits in wool.8
The simile is appropriate.

One receives the impression of

two men very hard at work:

Jevons, the hasty sculptor,

tirelessly chipping away at bedroek, incognizant of either
technique or detail; Marshall, the precise technician,
stitching each new thread with faultless care, lest an
unwanted flaw mar his fabric.

As a master of technique,

Marshall could not be expected to accept the apparent

7'The controversy over economic technique greatly dis
turbed Marshall and prompted him to write: "There are nine
or sixty ways of constructing tribal lays./And every
single one of them is right" (Quoted in Memorials, p. 318).
Q
Keynes, Essays, p. 144.

abandon with which Jevons had approached his Theory.
(Marshall's own major work, Principles of Economies, was
the product of more than twenty years' labor, during which
time he also completed the Economics of Industry (1879) and
two short monographs, The Pure Theory of Foreign Trade and
The Pure Theory of Domestic Values).

What concerns us here

is whether or not Marshall's attention to technical detail
colored his criticisms of the Theory.
Marshall was particularly impatient with Jevons' fre
quent utilization of causal chains to simplify relation
ships.

It will be recalled that Jevons summarized his

central position on value as follows;
...Cost of production determines supply;
Supply determines final degree of utility;
Pinal degree of utility determines value.9
Marshall writes;
...the greatest objection of all to (this)
formal statement of his central doctrine is that
it does not represent supply price, demand price
and amount produced as mutually determining one
another, but as determined one by another in a
series. It is as though when three balls A, B,
and G rest against one another in a bowl,
instead of saying that the position of the three
mutually determines one another under the action
of gravity, he had said that A determines B, and
B determines C. Some one else however with equal
Justice might say that C determines B and B deter
mines A. 10
Why not simply invert the order of the catena and express

9Jevons, Theory, p. 165.
"^Marshall, Principles, p. 56?.

“78the causal chain as follows?
...Utility determines the amount that has to be
supplied,
The amount that has to be supplied determines
cost of production,
^
Cost of production determines value.
If we are to accept the catena in its original form, what
prevents us, Marshall asks, from adopting this new form,
imputing the cause of A to C?

The critical point lies in

the ambiguity of Jevons' third statement that "final degree
of utility determines value."

This seems to infer that

market prices are arrived at merely through the interaction
and ultimate balancing of one marginal utility against
another.

But Jevons avoids mention of an equally signifi

cant factor, the relative purchasing power of consumers,
which he identifies with the "ratio of exchange." 12

This

confuses cause with effectj7 price ratios are determined:
...not solely by the final degrees of (a good's)
utility to them, but by these in conjunction
with the amounts of purchasing power severally
at their disposal. The exchange value of a
thing is the same all over a market; but the
final degrees of utility to which it corresponds
are not equal at any two parts.13
Had he translated his law of diminishing (marginal) util
ity into the language of pricing, Jevons might have avoided

Ibid. The implicit assumption behind this new chain
is that cost of production ultimately determines that supply
price which is requisite for keeping producers at their
work.
1?
See Jevons, Theory, pp. 78-81.
■^Marshall, Principles, p. 58?.

-79this error; but tbe unfortunate confusion of marginal util
ity with market price and "marginal demand" (the term is
Marshall's) remains.

Davenport writes:

...The concept of marginal utility is, beyond
question, of great significance in economic anal
ysis, though...it is often most disastrously con
fused with marginal purchaser's price, that is,
with relative marginal utility,— relative subjec
tive worth, subjective value....But evidently it
is only the latter concept that has any part or
share in the term value as a market category, and
expression of purchasing power. Value in this
relational sense emerges only when utilities, as
an individual category, have been, by different
individuals, conceived relatively to other util
ities to be displaced....In relative marginal
utility, loss in terms of something else, the
thought is carried over into the field of value.
Marshall recognized this confusion and derived the concept
of "marginal demand price," by which he meant the price
.which consumers are willing to pay for an additional unit
of a given commodity. 15
^

By dropping the identity between

marginal utility and marginal demand, Marshall is: able to
give clearer meaning to the concept of market equilibrium.
There can be little doubt that Marshall was the
superior technician; he could not accept Jevons' over
simplification of eausal relationships any more than he
could subscribe to Jevons' fragmentary definitions of
"trading bodies" and "the law of indifference."
ignores a significant truth:

But he

Jevons* organon is important

14

■JDavenport, Value, pp. 315-316.

■^Marshall, Principles, p. 56?•

-80not for the method in which it was presented, but for the
fact that it was rendered at all.

What Jevons says in the

Theory is significant; how he says it is of lesser rele
vance ;
...Jevons and the Austrians were held up to rid
icule as people, who, like school children, had
to be taught that 'when three balls...rest
against one another in a bowl...the position of
the three mutually determines one another under
the action, of gravity'....What Jevons and the
Austrians really did was not the nonsense imputed
to them in (this) passage but something very dif
ferent; they discovered precisely that the posi
tion of the balls is to be accounted for by a
single principle, gravitation in the case of
mechanics, utility in the case of economics.16
This comment by Schumpeter reflects a particular school of
thought which must, for want of a better term, be called
”neo-Utilitarian."

In contrast to Marshall— who,, as we

shall see, attempted to discount the viability of the mar
ginal utility principle— Schumpeter proposes that this
concept serves as the single most important factor in
determining market behavior.

To test this thesis the next

section is directed.
B.

Real Cost;

An Implicit Assumption in Jevonian Analysis?

We generally credit Marshall with having first recon
ciled the.utility and cost of production approaches to
value, though the historiography of economics offers sev
eral examples of writers who anticipated this synthesis.

16Schumpeter, History, p. 922.

-81The earliest attempt can he traced to Galiani, 17' who, had
he possessed the tools of marginal analysis, might have
equalled Marshall's accomplishment.

After Galiani we find

the division of value theorists into two camps:

the Class

icists, who imputed the cause of value to cost of produc
tion and only paid lip service to subjective valuation
(utility); and, secondly, the utilitarians, who reversed
the "classical" argument and stressed subjective rather
than cost elements.

In either case there is an exaggera

tion of the importance of one factor over another:

only

when the former proves ineffective can the latter have any
influence.

1R

Marshall found himself in the strange position of
having to reconcile the two principles while, at the same
time, attempting to defend the Classical case. 19x He pro
posed that "...the 'cost of production principle' and the
'final utility’ principle are undoubtedly component parts
of the one all-ruling law of supply and demand." 20

To

impute the cause of value to a single factor is to tell
only half a story.

Each of the two principles which

■^See ibid., pp. $00-302.
IQ

Thus Mill writes: "...since cost of production
here fails us we must resort to a law of value anterior to
cost of production and more fundamental, the law of demand
and supply" (Quoted in Marshall, Principles, p. 568).
■^See "The Role of Time Periods," p. 93.
20

Marshall, Principles, p. 569•
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...may be compared to one blade of a pair of scis
sors. When one blade is held still, and the cut
ting is effected by moving the other, we may say
with careless brevity that the cutting is done by
the second; but the statement is not one to be
made formally, and defended deliberately.21
Standing behind demand is marginal utility, as expressed in
the alternative prices which purchasers are willing to pay
for various quantities of a given commodity; behind supply,
marginal effort and sacrifice, which are reflected in sup
ply prices:
...When demand and supply are in equilibrium, the
amount of the commodity which is being produced
in a unit of time may be called the equilibriumamount, and the price at which it is being sold
may be called the equilibrium-price....When
demand and supply are in (this; stable equilib
rium, if any accident should move the scale of
production from its equilibrium position, there
will be instantly brought into play forces tend
ing to bring it back to that position; just as,
if a stone hanging by a string is displaced from
its equilibrium position, the force of gravity
will at once tend to bring it back to its equi
librium position.22
In essence this statement must be accepted as correct:
Marshall's partial equilibrium analysis compares favorably
with what is taught in present-day courses in introductory
economics.

But if we are to go beyond this statement to

the actual meanings of "demand price" and "real cost," we
encounter some discrepancies.

21

Ibid.

22Ibid.t pp. 4-25-4-26.

For instance, at times

Marshall seems as confused as Jevons had been over the
relationship between marginal utility and market price.

At

one point he writes in criticism o f ,Jevons:
...He had led many of his readers into a con
fusion. ..by speaking without qualification of
the price of a thing as measuring its final
utility, not only to the individual, which it
can do, but also to a 'trading body' which it
cannot do.23
But then he says:
...For each of (two men, one rich, one poor)
the marginal utility is measured by sixpence;
but this marginal utility is greater in the
ease of the poorer man than in that of the
richer.24
His inference is that price may, after all, serve as a mea
sure of marginal utility to an individual.

But since Mar

shall elsewhere emphatically states that this is not the ,
case, we must regard this statement as an unintentional
error.
Marshall's handling of the other major determinant of
value, "real costs," is a bit
the premise that there

more awkward.

He begins with

exists some relationship between the

"real costs of production" and "expenses of production,"
but he seems uncertainas to the nature of this
ship.

The former term

relation

refers to:
/

...the exertions of all the different kinds of
labour that are directly or indirectly involved
in making (a good); together with the abstinences

25rbid.,. p. 176.
24Ibid., p. 170.

/
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or rather the waitings required for saving the
capital used (in its production).25
"Expenses of production" on the other hand
•...are the prices which have to be paid in order
to call forth an adequate supply of the efforts
and waitings that are required for making (a
good); or, in other words, they are its supply
price.26
Marshall's implication seems to be that real costs are
those shared by persons who supply their factor inputs to
the entrepreneur; while expenses of production are costs
from the point of view of the entrepreneur himself. 27 Per
haps this^ is a valid distinction.

But this still says

nothing of the de facto relation between the two items.
Are we to assume that the amount of sacrifice in effort and
abstinence varies in direct proportion to the amount of the
payments for productive services; or, furthermore, that
there always exists an identity between the two amounts?
Marshall never tells us.

What is even more disturbing is

his equation of expenses of production and supply price.
If we are to accept his definition of the former— which
includes only the minimum or "necessary" costs incurred by
entrepreneurs— we must assume that entrepreneurs have
nothing left in the form of profits; such an assumption is
clearly unreasonable.

We conclude then that this second

identity is specious and that it will hold only when

^ I b i d . , p. 4-18.
^ Ibid.

^ S e e Davenport, Value, pp. 373-374-.

-85profits are added ‘to expense costs.
This brings us to an important question:

is the con

cept of real cost implicit in the writings of Jevons?
There is a good case which Schumpeter offers for the
po

affirmative:
...(Jevons) stood in no need of being told about
the two blades of Marshall1s pair of scissors.
What (he) aimed at showing was that both blades
consist of the same material— that both demand
and supply (no matter whether the case is one of
exchanging existing commodities or one of produc-pq
ing them) may be explained in terms of 'utility*.
The reader will recall that Jevons introduces 'disutili
ties' on the same level as utilities:

economics is the

calculus of not only pleasure, but also of its converse,
xn

pain.

In his treatment of equilibrium exchange^

he pro

poses that beyond some point successive 'utils' can only be
obtained at an increasingly greater sacrifice.

At the

fountainhead of disutility two forces are brought into
play:

exertion in the case of labor, abstinence in the

case of capital.

Regarding the first of these, Jevons

writes:
...By far the most important instance of nega
tive value is labour....Labour in the economic
po

In defining the scope of this paper, the author has
avoided Jevons' analysis of distributive shares, since
this is another subject altogether. The following argument
forms an exception to the prescribed rules, but this
digression on labor and capital is necessary in order to
corroborate Schumpeter's argument.
29Schumpeter, History, p. 922.
^See Jevons, Theory, pp. 95-98.

-86sense of the term is essentially disutility,
because it involves painful exertion; it is that
which we give in production in order to obtain
commodities. The labour given is painful to the
giver....Thus the crossing-sweeper incurs tedious
labour to ward off inconvenience and discomfort
from the wayfarer.31
The disutility attaching to the acquisition of a rate of
return on invested capital is also important, though less
obvious.

Capital is defined as:

...the aggregate of those commodities which are
required for sustaining labourers of any kind...
engaged in work....(It) allows us to expend
labour in advance. Thus, to raise corn we need
to turn over the surface of the soil. If we
proceed straight to the work, and use the imple
ments with which nature has furnished us-— our .
fingers-— we should spend -an enormous amount of
painful labour with very little result. It is
far better, therefore, to spend the first part
of pur labour in making a spade...to assist the
rest of our labour....(Thus) it is necessary to
begin the spending of labour a long time before
any goods can be finished.32
In other words only the crudest production process does not
require some sort of abstinence; the more complicated a
process becomes, the longer the period of abstinence.
(There is an obvious parallel between this and Bbhm-Bawerk's
"roundabout production' ^ concept.)

The rate of return on

invested capital represents a payment for the disutility

31

^ Jevons, Principles, p. 135»
^Jevons, Theory, pp. 223, 226-22?. It is strange
that Jevons, who was so disturbed by the classical emphasis
on labor-cost, should frame his capital concept in these
terms.
33

^ See E. V. Bohm-Bawerk, The Positive Theory of Capi
tal , London, MacMillan & Co., 1891, pp. 17-23„
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incurred in abstaining from present consumption and is
equal to "the rate of increase of the produce (as a func
tion of time) divided by the whole of the produce."^’
In short, Jevons uses the disutility concept as a
vehicle for introducting cost elements into his fabric, but
he does this only by implication.

In contrasting his

statements on disutility with Marshall's definition of
"real costs" we find a similarity which neither author
would probably have acknowledged.

In both instances costs

are measured in terms of 'sacrifice'; if we are to accept
Schumpeter's argument, we find that the only important dif
ference between the two theories is this:

whereas Mar

shall's delineation of cost phenomena is articulate and
precise, Jevons' is allusive and therefore more amenable to
the criticisms of those who would discount the heuristic
importance of the marginal utility concept.
0•

Jevons' Use of Mathematics
The quest for a concise language for expressing their

theories had led economists down three distinct paths by
1890:

first were those writers— virtually all of the Mer

cantilists and Classicists fall in this category— who confined themselves to non-mathematical exposition*, -5^5 next
xn
^ Stigler, Production, p. 27.
^"Numerical or algebraic formulations and numerical
calculations had occurred of course in the earlier stages
of economic analysis: there were the political

-88there were those who, mindful of the limitations of "liter
ary economics," pioneered the graphic method:

Dupuit (1844)

and

Jenkin (1871) were notable precursors of this approach;

and

finally in the writings of Bernouilli (1731), von Thxinen

(1826), Cournot (1838) and Jevons (1871) we see the growth
of symbolic notation and mathematical economics.

What we

would call "modern analysis" is of course a blending of all
three approaches; the synthesis is an accepted fact.

But

economists have come to recognize the value of all three
approaches only within recent years.

To anyone who has

studied economic journals over the past seventy-five years
the trend is obvious.

It was not so apparent at the time

Marshall wrote Principles in 1890.

In contrast to Jevons*

quasi-mathematical Theory, Principles stands as a monument
to literary economics and the graphic method.

Though he

felt a great respect for mathematics, Marshall doubted its
applicability to economic science.

In a letter (1906) to

Arthur Lyon Bowley he wrote:
...I know I had a growing feeling in the later
years of my work at the subject that a good
mathematical theorem dealing with economic
hypotheses was very unlikely to be good eco
nomics: and I went more and more on the rules:
(1) Use mathematics as a shorthand language
rather than as an engine of enquiry. (2) Keep
to them until you have done. (3) Translate
into English. (4) Then illustrate by examples

arithmeticians, the physiocrats, and many isolated instances
such as Brisco, Ceva...Condillac...(and to a limited extent)
Ricardo.„.and Marx. But (this) does not constitute mathe
matical economics" (Schumpeter, History, pp. 954-955)*

-89that are important in real life. (5) Burn the
mathematics, (6) If you can't succeed in (4)
burn (3).36
More than anything Marshall feared that economists would
become so enamoured with mathematics that they would leave
off studying real world conditions and devote their ener37 This is
gies to the construction of "economic toys."^'
the key to his indictment against Jevons' mathematics:
Professor Jevons has expressed almost all of
his reasonings in the English language, but he
has also expressed almost all of them in the
mathematical,,,.We owe several valuable sugges
tions to the many investigations in which
skilled mathematicians.have applied their
favourite method to the treatment of economical
problems. But all that has been important in
their reasonings and results has, with scarcely
an exception, been capable of being described
in ordinary language....(The Theory) would be
improved if the mathematics were omitted, but
the diagrams retained.38
A skilled mathematician in his own right, Marshall was
appalled by Jevons' not infrequent misuse of mathematical
reasoning.

In his review of the Theory Marshall writes:

...(Jevons) has not...fully availed himself of
the accuracy which he might have derived from
the use of (mathematics)....(In the first place)
he does not always point out what are the vari
ables as a function of which his quantities are
expressed. It is often necessary to understand
independently the whole of his reasoning, in
order to know whether he means his differential
co-efficients to be total or partial; and in

“^Quoted in
C. Pigou, Alfred Marshall and Current
Thought, London, MacMillan & Co., l953> PP° 8-9»
37
-^See ibid., pp. 9-12.
-^Memorials, pp. 97-99.

-90several cases he seems almost to have himself
forgotten that they are total.39
Marshall also questions Jevons' repeated ambivalence in
symbolic notation, as manifested in the latter's shifting
from differentiation to the delta process and baek to differentiation. 40 To carry his point to an extreme, Marshall
makes an attempt at integrating a number of Jevons' deriva
tives :
.. .A point on a locus may be determined by an
equation with a differential co-efficient in
it. (But) if we integrate (Jevons') equation,
we get, not this locus, but some other inter
secting it at the point to be determined
These errors might seem minor compared with Jevons' posi
tive contributions, but their presence in a work of such
importance was, in Marshall's estimation, clearly inadmis
sible.

But here is where Marshall's criticism of Jevons'

mathematics ends:

he did not— as he might have done quite

justifiably— pursue the point.

And it is in this area that

Jevons was most open to attack.
D.

Ethical Implications of Utilitarian Economics:

"Hedonics"

Of the many possible explanations for Marshall's dis
trust of the mathematical approach, one stands out above
the rest:

Jevons and other utilitarian writers had used

mathematics to cement an illegitimate union between economies

^ Memorials, p. 98.
40
See Jevons, Theory, pp. 95, 98, 130.
41Memorials, ibid.

-91and ethics.

"Hedonics," 42 the product of this union, was a

subject which must be outside the province of economic
theoreticians, since it precludes the making of unscien
tific "value judgments":
...It has however unfortunately happened that
customary uses of economic terms have sometimes
suggested the belief that economists are adher
ents of the philosophical system of Hedonism or
Utilitarianism. For, while they have generally
taken for granted that the greatest pleasures
are those which come with the endeavor to do
one's duty, they have spoken of 'pleasures' and
'pains' as supplying the motives to all action.^3
Jevons apparently thought he had absolved himself from the
fallacy of hedonics when he wrote:
...I have never felt that there is anything in.
(hedonism) to prevent our putting the widest
and highest interpretation upon the terms used.^
But in this regard his achievement was not up to his inten
tions:

he walks a fine line between ethics and economics

and often fails to distinguish between "desires" to maxi
mize utility and "motives" behind these desires.

Marshall

writes:
...It is true that this large use of 'pain and
pleasure' has sometimes served as a bridge by
which to pass from individualistic Hedonism to
a complete ethieal creed....(but) it is clearly
42Marshall has inaccurately been accorded credit for
having originated the phrase "hedonics." The author has
traced its origin to a pamphlet by J. Grote entitled A
Treatise on Moral Ideas. See the Oxford English Dictionary,
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1933, vol. V, pp. 189-190.
^Marshall, Principles, p. 77°
44 Jevons, Theory, p. 23.

not the part of economics to appear to take
side in ethical controversy <,4-5
Yet all
the accused.

a

too frequently the accuser seems asguilty as
Marshall's first edition of Principleshears

most of the marks of utilitarian analysis, as can he seen
in his habitual use of such hedonistic catch-words as "max
imum pleasure," "minimum pain," and the phrase "terminalvalue-in-use" (which corresponds to Jevons' "final degree
of utility")o^

Subsequent editions were revised to weed

out these utilitarian tracings— he replaced Jevons' "pain"
and "pleasure" with the equally generic "dissatisfaction"
and "satisfaction"-— hut the fact remains that Marshall was
never quite able to free himself completely from the yoke
of hedonics:

"satisfaction," like Jevons5 "pleasure," is

to be pursued not for its own sake, but for the purpose of
t±n

social betterment. '

In principle Marshall had trouble

accepting the unscientific alliance of economics and ethics
in practice he found it difficult to reject the role of
social reformer.

Pigou writes:

... economies for him was a handmaid to ethics,
not an end in itself, but a means to a further
end: an instrument, by the perfecting of which

45
^Marshall, Principles, p. 78.
46
See Howey, Marginal Utility School, pp. 84-85; also
P. T. Homan, Contemporary Economic Thought, New York,
Harper, 1928, p. 270.
^ S e e Memorials, p. 84.

-93it might be possible to better the conditions of
human life.^8
E.

The Role of Time Periods
Of no less concern to Marshall was Jevons’ apparent

incomprehension of the role of time periods and the effect
which changes over time have on price; even Ricardo had
been guilty of this error:
...The carelessness of Ricardo with regard to
the element of Time has been imitated by his
critics, and has thus been a source of twofold
misunderstanding. Eor they attempt to disprove
doctrines as to the ultimate tendencies, the
causes of causes, the causae causantes, of the
relations between cost of production and value,
by means of arguments based on the causes of
temporary changes, and short-period fluctuations
of value.4-9
To an extent Marshall's statement is correct, for Jevons
had virtually nothing to say about short- and long-run
pricing:^50 the exchange rates which he arrives at always
express marginal utility in relation to a fixed supply;
4-8
Ibid., p. 93. See also 1883 lecture by Marshall,
quoted in ibid., p. 83.
^Marshall, Principles, pp. 569-570.
50A brief summary of Marshall’s position on time
periods might be apropos: he distinguishes four periods,
each of which is characterized by a different set of forces.
In the first or -'market" period "’supply' is taken to mean
the stock of the commodity in question which is on hand"
(ibid., p. 451). In this instance supply is perfectly
inelastic and an increase in amount demanded will be matched
by a concomitant, equal increase in market price. There is
no entry or exit of either firms or factors. In the
"short-period" we allow for factor changes: '"supply1
means broadly what can be produced for the price in ques
tion with the existing stock of plant...in a given time"

-94that is, he assumes all supply curves are perfectly inelas
tic.

But Marshall goes to the opposite extreme when he says:
...Thus...as a general rule, the shorter the
period which we are considering, the greater
must he the share of our attention which is
given to the influence of demand on value; and
the longer the period, the more important will
be the influence of cost-of-production on
value.51

What he appears to forget is his own principle of the pair
of scissors:

the forces behind both demand and supply will

determine price, regardless of the time period under con
sideration.

The only distinction that would even partially

justify his statement is that in the long-run firms must
always cover out-of-pocket or marginal costs, whereas this
does not hold in the market period.

Schumpeter criticizes

Marshall's reasoning by way of an analogy:
(ibid.). Owing to the relative inelasticity of supply, an
increase in amount demanded will result in a price which is
greater than the original equilibrium price, but less than
the aforementioned market price. Entry or exit of firms is
impossible. In the long-run "'supply means what can be
produced by plant, which itself can be remuneratively pro
duced and applied within the given time" (ibid.) Factors
will enter in order for firms to achieve optimal effi
ciency; firms will also enter in order to take advantage of
the greater profit opportunities. Those faeing long-run
losses will leave. Given the increased supply potential
(and assuming increasing costs), the long-run supply curve
will be relatively elastic and at its point of intersection
with the demand curve a "normal price" will prevail. Mar
shall's fourth period, commonly referred to as the "long,
long run," involves secular movements of normal price
"caused by gradual growth of knowledge, of population and
of capital, and the changing conditions of demand and sup
ply from one generation to another" (ibid.).
51Ibid., p. 429.

-95...In its general import...(this statement)
gives the wrong lead...it is wrong to say that
foreign exchanges are determined by supply and
demand in the case of paper currencies, and by
the gold mechanism in the ease of gold curren
cies; what should be said is that the factors
behind supply and demand determine foreign
exchange rates, in any case, but that in the
case of gold currencies the gold mechanism will
in general prevent departure from gold parities
beyond the gold points.52
Marshall seems to imply that the marginal utility and costof-production principles are independent of one another;
but we know from the foregoing that this was not his inten
tion.

The fact is that at the center of Marshall's system

is the "fictional stationary state" in which cost-ofproduction would always govern value or "normal price":
...Each element of cost would be governed by
'natural laws', subject to some control from
fixed custom. There would be no reflex influ
ence of demand; no fundamental difference
between the immediate and the later effects of
economic causes.53
Jevons and other writers before him had implied that
dynamic analysis was virtually impossible, given the existing state of economic scienee. 54 Marshall regarded this as
an evasion of the issue and used the stationary state
device to bridge the gap between statics and what he wrongly
called "dynamics."

In this mythical state the influences

52Schumpeter, History, pp. 921-922.
-^Marshall, Principles, p. 4-4-0. Marshall treats this
for what it is: a device which is conceptually valuable but
of no practical importance in the real world. (See ibid.) >
54See Jevons, Theory, pp. 93-94-.
v
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periods become irrelevant:
...The general conditions of production and con
sumption, of distribution and exchange remain
motionless; but yet it is full of movement; for
it is a mode of life.55
There is no need to consider the effect which changes in
tastes, technology or factor availability have on price,
for they are assumed constant over time.

And since this is

so, entrepreneurs will come to expect this constancy; thus
price-expectations also are unimportant:
...In the stationary state then the plain rule
would be the cost of production ("normal cost'
faced by a'representative firnf) governs value
("normal price').56
We conclude from the above that Marshall's analysis of
the time element shows a marked advance over Jevons'
implicit treatment of time in the Theory.

Indeed, Marshall

had just cause for criticizing Jevons' preoccupation with
the "market period" and for his complete ignorance of
short- and long-run equilibria.
But both men approached the same problem from differ
ent angles and achieved different results.
text, neither treatment is incorrect:

Taken in con

if we confine

55
•^Marshall,
Principles, p. 439« This device is
supplemented by the concept of the "representative firm," a
quasi-"average" unit whose economies depended upon the
aggregate production of the good it produced. See ibid.,
pp. 397, 422, 450, 514.
56Ibid., p. 440. See also J. R. Hicks, Value and Cap
ital , Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1946, p. 117.
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ing Jevons' statement that final degree of utility (demand)
determines value; conversely, if we make use of Marshall's
"stationary state" model, we can defend his thesis that
value is determined by costs of production„ What we cannot
accept., however, is the fact that Marshall bases his criti
cism of devonian statics on a quasi-dynamic model.

He

apparently ignores the fact that Jevons explicitly stated
that he was working within a static framework in which the
so-called "streams of trade” were assumed constant.

Once

this is realized, we are forced to conclude that Marshall's
criticisms are really irrelevant.

CHAPTER VI
Conclusion
Whenever we probe below the surface of a body of eco
nomic ideas, we are certain to uncover a number of faetors
which belie the importance of these ideas.

So it has been

with our brief synopsis and evaluation of Jevonian value
theory.

In PART I, when we traced the circuitous path by

which Jevons expanded on the marginal utility principle,
we discovered that many of his thoughts were not wholly
original, but had been inherited from the English hedon
ists, the French mathematical writers, and various members
of the Oxford Utility School.

And again in PART II, when

we examined the Theory in terms of Marshallian criticisms
and Schumpeterian counter-criticisms, we questioned the
validity of Jevons" generalization of marginal utility,
and pointed to several significant technical errors in
Jevons" deduction.

We must now determine the extent to

which these factors detract from the Jevonian organon.
Jevons" single most important achievement was the
statement of the principle of diminishing marginal utility.
It was this device which permitted him to break free of the
Classical, production-oriented economics and to focus
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consideration on the consumption problem.

We have noted

several antecedents to Jevons * 'treatment of this problem-Gossen's "Second Law" and Senior's "Law of Variety" are
perhaps the most obvious— but Jevons must be credited with
having first portrayed the problem in a rigorous manner,
using mathematical notation.

He is the first English

writer to define marginal utility as the first derivative
of an individual's utility function.

Once the significance

of this achievement is realized, the many technical flaws
in his theory— the vague definitions, the naive "causal
chains," and even his obtuse extensions of the basic
exchange equation1— become irrelevant.

Why then do many

current economic historians discount the importance of
Jevons' accomplishment?
We offer three explanations.

In the first place most

writers tend to group Jevons with his contemporaries— the
Austrians, and Walras, and Pareto.

Consequently, his

achievements are dwarfed by the collective contributions of
all these utilitarian writers.

Only the less positive

aspects of Jevons' deduction remain:

(1) his treatment of

marginal utility as a function of only a single commodity;
(2) his failure to develop a dynamic model based on flowp
rather than stock-variables; (3) bis confusion of barter

■'■Jevons, Theory, p. 100.
p
See ibid, pp. 93-94; also Hutchison, Review, p. 43.
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and freely competitive exchange conditions; (4) his exclu
sive reliance upon market period analysis; and (5) his so-,
called "hedonics."

As we are reminded by current writers,

the progress of economic science has underscored the
seriousness of Jevons" errors.

We must agree.

What we

cannot accept, however, is the alacrity with which these
same writers dismiss Jevons as being the first English econ
omist to present the marginal utility device rigorously.
A second explanation for the lack of concern for
Jevons" work is an historical one.

As we noted in PART II,

Marshall took great pains to discount the significance of
the Theory.

There is little doubt that he succeeded.

Moreover, he also succeeded in presenting a theory which
drew largely on the very concept for which he had criti
cized Jevons.

We must credit him with having put value

theory in its proper perspective, by uniting the cost-ofproduction and utility approaches.

But we must not lose

sight of the fact that he was the originator of neither
approach, and that, as regards the latter, much of what
Marshall said had already been phrased in a less eloquent
way by Jevons.
The final reason which we offer for the current inat
tention to Jevons" Theory relates to the problems inherent
in utilitarian measurement.

The de facto value of the mar

ginal utility device remains today as a subject of economic
controversy.

Most writers, following Marshall’s line of

reasoning to a certain extent, would question the real sig
nificance of this device on the grounds that it presupposes
interpersonal utility comparison, poses behavioral questions
which fall within the province of psychology and sociology,
and leads economists into the unscientific realm of value
judgments.

Others, aligning themselves with the "neo-

Utilitarians," consider the device so important as to make
these difficulties seem insignificant.

We touched upon

this problem in PJLRT II's digression on "real cost," at
which time the author left it open for debate.

His reasons

for doing so can be best explained in a paragraph from
Jevons' last completed work:
...We must agree to differ, and though we are
bound to argue fearlessly, it should be with the
consciousness that there is room for wide and
bona fide difference of opinion. We must consent
to advance eautiously, step by step, feeling our
way, adopting no foregone conclusions, trusting
no single science, expecting no infallible
guide....We must recognize the fact clearly that
we have to deal with complex aggregates of people
and institutions, which we cannot usually dissect
and treat piece-meal. Tolerance, therefore, is
indispensable.3

-'Jevons, The State in Eelation to Labour, p. 166.

APPENDIX

It was during the year 1851° t h a t I began to
think that I eould and ought to do more than
others. A vague desire and determination grew
upon me....I felt it to be almost presumptuous
to pronounce to myself the hopes I held and the
schemes I formed. Time alone eould reveal
whether they were empty or real; only when
proved real could they be known to others.
William Stanley Jevons

APPENDIX A
Consumers' Behavior:
The Transition to Twentieth-Century Analysis
Prom the foregoing the reader might receive the false
impression that demand theory begins and ends with Jevons'
formulation of the marginal utility approach.

However, to

assume that his theory is the correct one, or even the only
one, is to ignore a very significant part of economic lit
erature.

In this appendix the author will attempt to out

line the major developments in demand analysis which took
place in the interim between Jevons' Theory (1871) and
Hicks' Revision of Demand Theory (1956).
Although the distinction between various approaches to
demand is not always obvious, we can generally describe
five stages'*' in the evolution of demand theory.
of course, with Jevons.

We begin,

What characterizes this first

stage has already been set out and may be summarized as
follows:

(1) acceptance of the cardinal utility principle,

whether explicitly (in the case of the Oxford Utility
School) or, implicitly (in the writings of Jevons, Marshall,

■^See Stigler, "Utility Theory"; also Hutchison, Review,
pp. 503-30?.
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-104and Walras); (2) incomprehension of complementary relation
ships between goods (Marshall is the exception); and (3)
treatment of marginal utility as a function of a single
good.

2

We can broadly define the second stage in the develop
ment of demand theory in terms of two contributions by
Edgeworth, and Auspitz and Lieben, respectively:

(l) the

treatment of marginal utility as a function of the quanti
ties of all goods involved in a person's consumption pat
tern; and (2) the introduction of complementarity between
goods.

It must be noted that all three of these writers

anticipate "indifference curve analysis," although their
method of presentation is less rigorous than that of Vilfredo Pareto, who is properly classed in the next period.
In Mathematical Psychics Edgeworth combines indifference
curves— which, unlike their present familiar form, are
drawn concave to the origin— and price-lines to determine
a point of maximum consumer satisfaction.

Auspitz and

Lieben*s "constant-satisfaction curves" bear a close simi
larity to the Edgeworth curves, although there is evidence
4
that they arrived at their analysis independently.
The writings of Pareto and Fisher reflect what we

^Ibid., p. 303»
’^See
3
Edgeworth, Mathematical Psychics, pp. 21-22.
4 See R. Auspitz and R. Lieben, Untersuchungen Uber die
Theorie des Preises, Leipzig, Duncker & Humblot, 1889.
~

-105shall call the third period in the evolution of demand
theory.

Realization of the limitations imposed by the car

dinality problem led these men to a non-ntility analysis of
consumer behavior.

The earlier indifference curve analysis

provided a means for extruding "utility” from value theory
as being measureable.

That they did not wholly succeed in

accomplishing this can be attributed to the fact that
neither of these men was able to redefine the law of diminishing utility and complementarity in non-utility terms. 5
A major development occurred in the fourth stage with
the introduction of the concept of the "marginal rate of
substitution."

Although we generally credit Hicks with

having conceived this device, its origin can be traced to
the writings of two earlier economists who published during
the second decade of this century.

W. E. Johnson's article

on "The Pure Theory of Utility Curves" (1913) outlines the
general form of the concept, however less rigorously than
his successors:
...This impossibility of measurement does not
affect any economic problem. Neither does eco
nomies need to know the marginal (rate of)
utility of a commodity. What is needed is a
representation of the ratio of one marginal
utility to another. In fact, this ratio is pre
cisely represented by the slope at any point of
the utility curve.6
5

^See Hutchison, Review, p. 303*
^W. E. Johnson, "The Pure Theory of Utility Curves,"
Economic Journal, 1913* P« 4-90.

-106What Johnson states implicitly, Slutsky expresses explicitly
7

in his "Sulla Theoria del Bilancio del Consummatore."'

In

this highly mathematical article Slutsky completes the
extrusion of utility, thereby anticipating much of the later
deduction by Hicks and Allen.

He rightly deserves credit

for having rigorously distinguished between the substitution
Q
and income effects of price changes.
A rediscovery of his
work by Hicks and Allen took place in 1934-» their findings
being published in "A Reconsideration of the Theory of
9 But perhaps the most representative work of this
Value."'
period is Hicks' Value and Capital (1939)-

In essence this

book is an attempt to redefine consumer behavior in non
utility terms, thereby bypassing the unnecessary cardinal
ity assumptions of earlier writers.
7
'E.
matore,"
R. G. D.
Choice,"

Two of the more

Slutsky, "Sulla Theoria del Bilancio del ConsumGiornale degli Economisti, LI, 1915 • See also
Allen, "Professor Slutsky's Theory of Consumer's
Review of Economic Studies, IV, 1936.

O

A complete separation of these two effects is pos
sible only when we use the indifference-curve approach to
demand. If we assume the price of X to fall relative to
the price of Y, the effects can be isolated as follows:
the substitution effect (with real income temporarily held
constant) is shown by a shift along the same indifference
curve towards the X axis; conversely, the income effect
represents the change in real income whieh is generated by
the price change, and would be shown by a movement to a
higher indifference curve. For further information see R.
H. Leftwich, The Price System and Resource Allocation, New
York, Rhinehart & Go., pp. 87-90; also Hicks, Value, pp.
q
J. R. Hicks and R. G. D. Allen, "A Reconsideration
of the Theory of Value," Economica, III, 1934-.

-107outstanding devices which Hicks uses to accomplish this are
(1) the marginal rate of substitution, which replaces Jevons’
marginal utility; and, following from this, (2) the principle
of diminishing marginal rate of substitution, supplanting
diminishing marginal utility.

Each indifference curve will

show a given scale of preferences which an individual con
sumer applies to two commodities.

According to this approach

consumers are unable to quantify the satisfactions derived
from the consumption
that each

of a good.

All that can be said is

individual will prefer onescale of preferences

to another, the former being represented by a higher curve
on his "indifference map."

We must assume that the two

goods displayed on the map are substitutable, so that as
relative prices change the substitution effect can be
brought into play.

At any single point along an indiffer

ence curve we can define its slope in terms of a ratio
between the marginal utilities of the two goods.

Hicks

prefers to abandon the term "ratio of utilities" for his
own phrase, the marginal rate of substitution:
...We may define the marginal rate of substitu
tion of X for Y as the quantity of Y which would
just
compensate the consumer for the loss of a
marginal unit of X.10
Through this device we eliminate the problem of cardinal
measurement.

The concept is particularly significant when

we wish to describe an equilibrium with respect to a system

■^Hicks, Value, p. 20.

-108of market prices.

At this point a consumer's marginal rate

of substitution between two goods will equal the ratio of
prices of these goods.

Were this not so, a consumer would

find it advantageous to substitute more units of one good
for a marginal unit of another, therefore achieving a new
equilibrium.

In terms of the indifference map equilibrium

is shown by the tangency of a single curve and the socalled "price-line."
Hicks goes on to say that if we are to attack the mar
ginal utility device, we must also destroy the principle
upon which it is founded, diminishing marginal utility.
But what can we substitute for it?
...By the rule that the indifference curves must
be convex to the axes. This may be called...the
principle of diminishing marginal rate of sub
stitution.11
Indifference curve convexity will dictate the follow
ing :
...Suppose we start with a given quantity of
goods, and then go on increasing the amount of X
and diminishing that of Y in such a way that the
consumer is left neither better off nor worse off
on balance; then the amount of Y which has to be
subtracted in order to set off a second unit of X
will be less than that which has to be subtracted
in order to set off the first unit. In other
words, the more X is substituted for Y, the less
will be the marginal rate of substitution of X
for Y.12
This is not the same as diminishing marginal utility,

1 ]Tbid.

IP

Ibid., pp. 20-21.

-109although hoth concepts are employed for similar reasons:
that is, to define an equilibrium condition.
...Unless, at the point of equilibrium, the mar
ginal rate of substitution is diminishing, equi
librium will not be stable.13
Hence, we can have a situation develop in which the marginal
rate of substitution will be equal to the price ratio, and
still not have an equilibrium.

The reason is quite obvious:

this identity can hold under conditions of both increasing
and diminishing marginal rate of substitution.

If the lat

ter case is in effect, and the identity holds, the equilib
rium must necessarily be a stable one.

But if the marginal

rate of substitution is increasing, and (again) the iden
tity holds, consumers will find it advantageous to acquire
a larger quantity of commodity; therefore, they would move
to a new equilibrium position:
...It is clear, therefore, that for any point to
be a possible rate of equilibrium at appropriate
prices the marginal rate of substitution at that
point must be diminishing.!^
These concepts can best be clarified by a diagram, in whieh
AB represents a consumer’s indifference curve and ML, his
price line:

^ Ibid., p. 21.
14Ibid., p. 22.
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The reader will observe that at point Q /there is an equa
tion of the marginal rate of substitution and the prieeratio, beeause of the tangency of the indifference curve
and the price-line. However, this cannot be a stable equi
librium, since at this point the marginal rate of substitu
tion is increasing; that is, the indifference curve is
concave to the axis.

This implies that by moving to the

right or left of Q the consumer is able to reach a higher
indifference curve, thereby disturbing the original equi
librium.

He would proceed until he reached another point

at which a diminishing marginal rate of substitution was
equal to the price ratio, and would remain there until some
exogenous chapge brought about an increase in real income,
allowing him to move to a higher indifference curve.
While the writings of economists of the fourth stage
represent a definite advance in the literature, they have
come under close scrutiny in the past few years.

We are

now in the process of approaching a fifth stage in the

- I l lr -

evolution .of demand theory.

The outlines of this new

approach are sketched in a number of journal articles 15
^ and
a very few hooks published during the last two decades.
Included in the latter category is Hicks' Revision of
Demand Theory; which is his attempt at revising certain
parts of Value and Capital.
The essential distinction between Hicks' new approach
and that of earlier economists is that it takes advantage
of econometric method and the so-called "preference hypoth
esis."
...Faced with factual data about quantities of
commodities purchased and with the task of
■^For further information see: F. Machlup, "Profes
sor Hicks' Revision of Demand Theory," American Economic
Review, XLVII, March, 1957*
F. Machlup,."The Problem of Verification in Eco
nomics," Southern Economic Journal, XXII, July, 1955.
. W. E. Armstrong, "Theory of Consumers' Behavior,"
Oxford Economic Papers, 1950.
P. K. Newman, "The Foundations of Revealed Preference
Theory," Oxford Economic Papers, June, 1955«
H. S. Houthakker, "Revealed Preference and the Util
ity Function," Economica, XVII, 1950.
0. Lange, "Complementarity and Inter-relations of
Shifts in Demand," Review of Economic Studies, VIII, Octo
ber, 194-0.
S. Ichimura, "A Critical Note on the Definition of
Related Goods," Review of Economic Studies, XVIII, 1950-51.
P. A. Samuelson, "Consumption Theorems in Terms of
Over-compensation rather than Indifference Comparisons,"
Economica, XX, 1955.
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explaining changes in these quantities, the econ
omist has at least three possibilities: explana
tions in terms of nonprice data, explanations in
terms of effects of current price changes, and
explanations in terms of lagged effects of price
changes.16
What is needed is some method of isolating current-price
effects from the other effects:
...The econometric purpose of the theory of
demand is to give assistance in making this sep
aration. ...The kind of theory which is needed...
is one which will tell us something about the
ways in which consumers would be likely to react
if variations in current prices and incomes were
the only causes of changes in consumption.17
This theory necessitates postulating an "ideal consumer,"
who, by definition, is unaffected by anything other than
current market conditions.

Using this postulate we are

able to formulate certain principles of consumer behavior:
...The assumption of behavior according to a
scale of preferences comes in here as the sim
plest hypothesis....What (is meant) by action
according to a scale of preferences is the fol
lowing. The ideal consumer... chooses that
alternative, out of the various alternatives
open to him, which he most prefers, or ranks
most highly. In one set of market conditions
he makes one choice, in others other choices;
but the choices he makes always express the
same ordering, and must therefore be consistent
with one a n o t h e r . 18

16Machlup, "Professor Hicks' Revision of Demand
Theory," p . 120.
17'J. R. Hicks, A Revision of Demand Theory, Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1956, p. 17.
18 Ibid., pp. 17-18. Hicks admits that empirical test
ing of the preference hypothesis is not possible: "I feel
obliged to conclude...that there is in practice no direct
test of the preference hypothesis" (ibid., p. 58).

Economists must take care to distinguish between the two
general types of logical ordering:

"strong ordering,” in

which each commodity has a special, unique place in the
order; and "weak ordering," in which certain commodities
cluster in groups, and it becomes impossible to place one
ahead of another.

(An example of the latter is the indif

ference curve, since any point along a single curve is
equally desirable as all other points.)

When commodities

are available only in discrete units, we must acknowledge
the superiority of strong ordering.

But "strong ordering

has to be given up" whenever commodities are imperfectly
divisible and the money used to purchase these goods is
"finely divisible."

Hicks prefers the latter approach, but

admits that acceptance of it requires us to adopt two basic
assumptions:
...that the consumer will, always prefer a larger
amount of money to a smaller amount and that his
preference order is transitive.19
The latter assumption of transitivity implies that all
items in a set are capable of being ordered in a "straightforward unidirectional manner.”20
Once we accept the logic of weak ordering and the two
additional assumptions, we are able to deduce all the major
principles of the theory of consumer's demand.

■^Machlup, "Professor Hicks'," p. 121.
20Hicks, Revision, p. 27.

The

-114simplest case is, of course, that of the demand for a single
commodity.

Under this condition, a consumer is "...con

fronted with a market in which the price of no more than.one
good is liable to change." 21
principle of downward-sioping

His actions will depend on the
demand.

We can prove this by

isolating the substitution and income effects.

The former

will depend upon the so-called "consistency condition"
(which is Hicks' term for the first assumption above).

He

demonstrates that this effect acts to increase the quantity
demanded of a good when the good sells at a reduced price.
Conversely, the income effect will depend on what Hicks'
calls "observation" (Machlup prefers to define this effect
in terms of. "normal" and "inferior” goods, which amounts to
the same thing). 22

When we deal with normal goods, the

income and substitution effects of a change in price will
be similar.

But in the case of inferior goods— the so5 we have an exception to the law of
called "Giffen Case" 2;
^—

downward-sloping demand.

In this instance the substitution

effect is much smaller than the income effect, and "the
proportion of income spent upon the inferior good must be
large."24

21Ibid., p. 47.
22

See Machlup, "Professor Hicks," pp. 121-122.

2 7>

^See Hicks, Revision, p. 67.

2^ Ibid., p. 66.

-115But economists are incorrect in assuming that the
income and substitution effects can be nicely isolated as
we have described.

In actuality there is not one, but sev

eral pairs of effects, each referring to a different set of
price variations.

Delineation of these effects forms the

largest part of Hicks' Revision of Demand Iheory and cannot
be summarized here.

For further information the reader is

referred to this work and others which have already been
listed in the author's footnotes.

APPENDIX B
Jevons1 Theory of Distributive Shares:
Selected. References
The reader who wishes to investigate Jevons' theory of
distribution further may find the following reference list
of some value:
BOOKS
Bell, J. P., A History of Economic Thought.
Ronald, 1953, PP» 414-416, 507, 575-

New York:

Davenport, H. J., Value and Distribution. Chicago: Uni
versity of Chicago Press, 1908, pp. 209, 290-95.
Eckard, E. W., The Economics of W. S. Jevons. Washington,
D. C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1940,
pp. 25-51.
Ferguson, J. M., Landmarks of Economic Thought. London:
Longmans, 1938, pp. 161-162, 165, 182.
Howey, R. S., The Rise of the Marginal Utility School,
1870-1889. Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas
Press, I960, pp. 58-59.
Hutchison, T. W., A Review of Economic Doetrines, 1870-1929
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953, 44-46.
Jevons, W. S., The Principle of Economics.
Millan, 1905, PP. 67-85, 98-120.

London:

, The Theory of Political Economy.
Kelley & Hillman, 1957, pp. 167-273.
Kinloch, T. F., Six English Economists. London:
pp. 64-65.

Mac

New York:
Gee, 1933

Mitchell, W. C ., Lecture Notes on Types of Economic Theory.
New York: Kelley, 1949, pp. 41-46.
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-117Roll, E., A History of Economic Thought. Englewood. Cliffs,
N. J.: .. Prentice-Hall, 1956, ppT 382-384.
Schumpeter, J. A., History of Economic Analysis. Hew York:
Oxford University Press, 1954-, pp. 637, 893, 902-903,
905, 913, 927-929, 940-94-2.
Stigler, G. J., Production and Distribution Theories. New
York: MacMillan, 1941, pp. 13-37, 98.

ARTICLES AND ESSAYS
Black, R. D», "Jevons and Cairnes," Economica, August,
I960, pp. 225-226.
Jevons, H. S., "William Stanley Jevons: His Scientific
Contributions," Econometrics, July, 1934-, pp. 234— 236.
Jevons, W. S., "A Brief Account of a General Mathematical
Theory of Political Economy," pp. 284— 287•
Robertson, R. M., "Jevons and His Precursors," Econometrics,
July, 1951, PP. 24-8-24-9.

APPENDIX C
Correspondence
In Appendix ¥ (p. 333) to the Theory of Political Econ
omy Jevons allndes to the fact that he employed intersecting
supply and demand curves in his lectures at Owens College
(1863).

If this is correct, it would shed new light upon

the question of priority in the graphic approach.,,

Since

none of Jevons* published works contain such supply-demand
diagrams, the author has attempted to ascertain whether or
not Jevons included these graphs in manuscripts which have
not been reproduced.

Letters of correspondence in this

regard are duplicated below:
October 19, i960
Dear Sirs:
As a student currently engaged in research into
the writings of William Stanley Jevons, I would
inquire whether any of his unpublished manu
scripts are available through________________ .
Mr. Augustus Kelley of Kelley & Hillman, Inc.,
suggests that Jevons* lectures might have been
privately reproduced and proposes that I contact
you in this regard.
Yours truly,
D. P. Cole
********
-118-

-119The Library
University of Liverpool
Liverpool 3
November 11, I960
Dear Mr. Cole,
I have been unable to trace a private reproduc
tion of unpublished lectures of ¥. S. Jevons.
This Library does not possess one, nor does our
Dept, of Economics know of one. I have also
enquired of the Bodleian Library, which keeps an
index of photocopies held by British libraries,
but they tell me that it records no manuscripts
of any sort by Jevons.
I would suggest writing to the Department of
Manuscripts, British Museum, London, W.C.I.
They may be able to tell you where Jevons lec
tures are to be found.
Yours sincerely,
D. T. Cook
Curator of Special Collections

Department of Manuscripts
British Museum
London, W.C.I.
23rd November, I960
Dear Sir,
The Keeper of Manuscripts has asked me to reply
to your letter of 17th November.
No lecture notes of W. S. Jevons are listed in
the published Catalogue of Additions to the Man
uscripts in the British Museum. There is as yet
no published index to MSS. acquired by this
Department since 1930, but so far as I can see,
they include no lecture notes of Jevons.
Yours faithfully,
M.S.P. Borrie
Assistant Keeper
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